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Executive summary 
Case studies in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States have examined how 
green electricity market penetration has evolved and the main driving forces behind its 
development. Over the past few decades, all of the countries studied have employed a mix of 
policy instruments to support renewable energy and have had one or more shifts in policy 
focus. The 1970s focused primarily on R&D stimulus, followed by investment subsidies in 
the 1980s, consumers’ support in the 1990s and producers’ support at present. Most case-
study countries support renewable energy with financial incentives. The quota system in 
Sweden and the renewable portfolio standard of the United States are presently the only non-
financial instruments applied. Countries do not stimulate different renewable technologies 
neutrally. Germany and the Netherlands, for example, differentiate their feed-in tariffs by 
technology. The Swedish quota system, however, does not differentiate between renewable 
energy technologies. Because the quota system sets targets for the share of renewables as a 
whole, it is likely selects the least-cost among technologies presently available. 
 
The lessons from the case studies are applied to the case of Norway, a country where virtually 
all current electricity needs are satisfied by large-scale hydroelectric power, but where 
additional capacity will be needed in the future. A lesson to emerge from the case studies is 
the importance of a clear, consistent, and coherent policy as investors require long term 
stability. For a country to develop a clear and consistent policy on green electricity, with the 
appropriate resources allocated to its implementation, it must place green electricity high on 
the political agenda. In addition, consistent and cohesive policy design requires a careful 
consideration of the policy options available. These policy options include feed-in tariffs, 
green certificates under quota obligations, and subsidies for research and development as well 
as for adoption. The report concludes that feed-in tariffs have important advantages with 
respect to flexibility and ease of implementation. Sweden has, however, already opted for a 
green certificates scheme, and this – together with potential developments in EU in the same 
direction – could potentially be important enough for Norway to choose such a system. 
Another dimension important in green electricity development is research on new 
technologies. Here, the report recommends a scheme with publicly funded research, perhaps 
funded with resources raised from energy and electricity consumption, though the source of 
funding is less important. Finally, once a policy is designed, its success depends on the extent 
to which it is implemented, which, in turn, depends greatly on existing implementation 
capacity and efforts to strengthen implementation capacity.  
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1 Introduction 
Renewable energy development has evolved differently in national and regional settings in 
the past decades. Interest in renewable energy began with increased environmental awareness 
in the 1960s and in debates concerning the relative merits of nuclear power versus fossil fuels 
for meeting increasing demand for electricity. In the mid-1970s and 1980s, interest in 
renewable energy surged as a result of the “energy crisis” caused by the disruption of oil 
supplies and the rising prices of oil and other fossil fuels. From the early 1990s, interest in 
renewable energy continued to grow because of widespread interest in sustainable 
development following the report “Our Common Future” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987). In the 1990s, debates on renewable energy got an extra 
stimulus from international environmental actions, such as the UN Framework on Climate 
Change in Rio (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997). Interest intensified over the past several 
years because of the need to implement cost-effective greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation 
policies, concerns for energy security, reduction of local environmental impacts of fossil fuels 
burning, global integration and liberalization of the energy market.1 Recently, attention stems 
from the adoption of EU’s RES-Directive and the Political Declaration and the International 
Action Programme at the International Renewable Energy Conference in Bonn (2004), which 
has indicated a new trend of development on renewable power generation, and even more is 
expected at the Bonn follow-up ministerial conference to be held in Beijing in November 
2005. 
Agencies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the International Energy Agency (IEA) have focused their attention on the issue, and 
interest has intensified because of the need to implement cost-effective GHG mitigation 
policies, increase global integration and liberalize energy markets throughout the world.2 
Politicians and business leaders are increasingly concerned about speeding up the 
development of renewable energy technologies and their market adaptation. Government 
regulations and incentive policies play a critical role in promoting renewable energy. There is 
also a growing interest in developing and using cleaner energy from environmentally-
concerned industries, including electric utilities. Consumers increasingly demand more 
flexible systems, more choices, stricter environmental standards and higher quality electricity 
supply and services. Quite possibly, the 21st century will be seen as a critical time for the 
development and large-scale market dissemination of electricity from renewable energy 
sources. 
The terms “green energy” and “green electricity” are evocative, popular terms, with a 
variety of meanings at best relating to a blend of objectives. One avenue towards clarification 
is to distinguish between the ultimate services that energy consumption provides. IEA (2002) 
identifies the four main energy services as transport, stationary services, electrical uses and 
fuel inputs to power generation. This report focuses on electricity,3 and further differentiates 
electricity according to how it is produced. Green electricity is produced from wind, solar, 
biomass, geothermal, hydropower4 and wave/tidal sources.  
                                                     
1 A recent driver in Europe is the implementation of the EU Directive 2001/77/EC on renewable energy 
sources, known as the “RES-Directive” (EU 2001).  
 
2 OECD 1998, 2001. 
3 The production of heat from renewable energy sources is discussed in the Norwegian case but is not 
included in the other case-study countries.  
4 The EU (2001) RES Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources does not distinguish between large-scale and small-scale hydropower. However, earlier EU 
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The interest in green energy – and more specifically green electricity – can be related to 
policy objectives, including energy security, environmental protection and climate change 
mitigation. As a practical matter for this report, allowing for several underlying policy 
objectives, we assume that these are operationalized as increasing the share of renewable 
energy sources in electricity production. It is increasingly recognized that green electricity 
becomes a very important component in electricity production as worldwide demand for 
electricity increases. Thus, it is important to review policies designed to increase utilization of 
renewable energy sources. Alongside instruments such as Europe’s emission trading system 
(2005-2007) and the Kyoto quota market (2008-2012) that are designed to reduce CO2 
emissions, green electricity development adds a new dimension to electric power production 
and consumption. In general terms, a policy intervention either taxes non-green electricity 
and/or subsidizes green electricity. This allows renewable energy technologies to compete 
when they otherwise could not, potentially allowing them to develop and become more 
competitive. Specific policy instruments vary widely (see chapter 3), and include such options 
as using quotas rather than price instruments, influencing research rather than expanding the 
use of existing technologies.  
This report reviews the development of green electricity markets in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States (see Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2004; van Rooijen 
and van Wees 2003; Wang 2004; Menz 2004; and Menz and Vachon 2004). These case-
studies compare how the countries differ in terms of resource endowments, energy politics, 
energy industry structures, regulatory policies, energy prices, citizen attitudes, and the mass 
media involvement. They examine how green electricity market penetration has evolved, and 
the main driving forces behind its development. This report presents the main findings of the 
case studies and discusses how the findings may be relevant for potential green electricity 
policy and market development in Norway. While virtually all of Norway’s current electricity 
needs are satisfied by large-scale hydroelectric power, additional capacity will be needed in 
the relatively near future. Identifying policy options for Norway is therefore important 
because of the increasing role that green electricity could play in providing sustainable and 
secure energy supplies in the future. This report describes potential impediments, existing 
public policies, and possible measures for increasing production and use of green electricity 
in Norway.  
The report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 focuses on driving forces for and barriers 
against green electricity market development, and the status and outlook for green electricity 
in the case-study countries. Chapter 3 discusses the policy objectives, categorizes policy 
instruments, addresses the institutional aspects of policy development and analyses the 
instruments applied in the four case-study countries. Chapter 4 analyzes resources, supply and 
demand for electricity, and the green electricity market development in Norway. In 
conclusion, Chapter 5 makes the policy recommendations for Norway on its future 
development of green electricity. 
2 Green Electricity Market Development 
How important are renewable energy sources for electricity production today? The IEA 
(2002) estimates that 39 percent of the global production of electricity in 2000 was supplied 
by coal, while gas, nuclear and hydropower all supplied 17 percent each. The remaining 
electricity production was from oil (8%) and other renewables (2%). The mixture varies 
across regions; for example, hydropower supplied 68 percent of the electricity in Latin 
                                                                                                                                                        
documents define large hydro as projects above 10 MW installed capacity. A strict definition of green 
electricity should exclude electricity produced from large hydropower because of its environmental and 
social impacts. See sections 3.1 and 4.4 for more details on the RES Directive. 
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America but only 12 percent in Europe. The share of other renewables did not exceed 3 
percent in any region for 2000. The country-specific statistics (IEA 2001a) in Table 2.1 show 
that there are significant variations across countries in terms of the fuel mix for electricity 
production.  
Table 2.1 Electricity Production by Energy Carrier in Major Countries*, 2001 (percent) 
Country Fossil 
fuels 
Nuclear Waste Hydro Biomass Geothermal Other** 
Australia 91.5 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.6 0.0 0.1 
Canada 29.1 13.0 0.0 56.7 1.2 0.0 0.1 
China 79.8 1.2 0.0 18.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 
France 8.6 76.5 0.3 14.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 
Germany 62.5 29.4 1.8 4.0 0.5 0.0 1.8 
India 83.1 3.4 0.0 12.8 0.3 0.0 0.3 
Italy 77.4 0.0 0.6 19.3 0.3 1.6 0.7 
Japan 58.7 30.7 0.5 9.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 
Netherlands 90.7 4.2 2.7 0.1 1.0 0.0 1.1 
Norway 0.4 0.0 0.0 99.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Russia 64.6 15.4 0.3 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sweden 4.0 44.6 0.3 49.0 1.9 0.0 0.3 
UK 73.5 23.4 0.4 1.7 0.9 0.0 0.3 
USA 71.0 20.8 0.6 5.7 1.2 0.4 0.2 
Source: IEA 2001a 
*   Norway is included for comparison. 
** Includes solar and wind. 
 
2.1 Main Driving Forces 
A way to examine the cross-sectional patterns of electricity production as shown in Table 2.1 
is to look at key driving forces: resource availability, and political, environmental, 
technological and economic factors. These are, of course, not independent of one another, but 
one can argue that in the cross-sectional pattern, there is an almost hierarchical order. First, 
nature itself exercises a heavy hand through the natural resource base. Countries are to a 
varying extent endowed with resources such as hydropower, geothermal energy and coal, 
which for reasons of transportation costs allow country-specific cost advantages for those 
energy sources. Second, there are political driving forces. These are related to other driving 
forces, perhaps particularly environmental and economic, and their traces are also heavy, in 
particular for nuclear power. The economics or technology of nuclear power depends less on 
the natural resource base than political factors (some of those concerns are environmental), so 
the main characteristic of France is that the country combines (or perhaps responds to) a 
scarcity of other energy sources with politics that have allowed nuclear power development. 
Environmental concerns have had influence beyond nuclear power, in particular for the point 
at which countries stop further development of their hydropower resources (in Norway, for 
instance). For coal combustion, environmental concerns have been important in making coal 
combustion cleaner, switching to cleaner coal, and to some extent replacing coal with other 
CICERO Report 2005:03  
Green Electricity Market Development 
 
 
 
 
5
sources of energy. Nevertheless in the USA and Europe, coal-fired power plants have retained 
their competitiveness, even for new plants, while the pressure on emissions has grown.  
2.1.1 The Natural Resource Base 
The fuel mix of a country’s electricity production can to a large extent reflect its given natural 
resources. Some countries (such as Norway, Canada and Sweden) have significant water 
resources, while others (such as Australia, China, Germany and the USA) have significant 
coal resources. Increased use of renewable energy resources could be driven by the limited 
availability of fossil fuels. Assessments of fossil fuel availability usually focus on 
conventional hydrocarbon reserves, i.e. those occurrences that can be exploited with current 
technologies and market conditions. Rogner (1997) finds that the focus on reserves 
underestimates long-term global hydrocarbon availability. But the potential accessibility of 
fossil fuels increases dramatically if the vast unconventional hydrocarbons are included in the 
resource estimates. This is based on the application of historically observed rates of 
technology change and long-term production costs that are not significantly higher than 
present market prices. 
Nevertheless, fossil fuels will become scarcer over time, and renewable energy sources 
could play a larger role in energy markets. Globally, there are vast amounts of renewable 
energy resources that could be utilized for electricity production. This is shown in an 
assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001). The global 
technical potential of hydropower is estimated at 14,000 TWh/year, while the economic 
potential is limited to 6,900-8,700 TWh/year. The largest potentials are in Latin America, 
Asia and the former Soviet Republic countries. Globally, biomass has a technical energy 
potential of 396 EJ/year, with the largest potential for development in South America and 
Africa. The global theoretical wind potential is estimated at 480,000 TWh/year, but 20,000 
TWh5 is given as a more realistic potential. When it comes to solar energy, even the lowest 
estimates of technical potential exceed current global energy use by a factor of four. 
Many scenarios have been developed to help project future energy supply and demand. The 
IEA (2002) estimates that electricity production from both hydropower and other renewables 
will increase towards 2020. The increase in production of electricity from hydropower will 
mainly take place in developing countries where there still is a large potential. However, 
hydropower’s share of global production will be reduced to 15 percent. Most of the growth in 
electricity production from other renewables will take place in OECD countries, and its share 
of global production will increase to 3 percent. Biomass and wind power will account for 
most of the projected growth, but it is expected that geothermal, solar and other power 
sources will contribute more after 2020. Other studies also project the extent to which 
renewable resources will meet the demand for energy and electricity. The IPCC developed a 
set of scenarios until 2100, and these were presented in a Special Report on Emission 
Scenarios (IPCC 2000). Although the study does not project the fuel mix for electricity 
production, it does project the share of renewables of primary energy. For 2020, this share 
varies from 5 to 19 percent in the marker scenarios, while the share in 2100 varies from 14 to 
80 percent. The wide range reflects the differences in the driving forces for the scenarios, 
such as demographic change, economic growth rates and technological change. The US 
Energy Information Administration6 (EIA 2004b) projects that global electricity production 
from hydropower and other renewables will increase by 57 percent from 2001 to 2025, but its 
share of total electricity production will remain at the current level of 20 percent.  
                                                     
5 Technical potential assumes that 27 percent of the earth’s surface is exposed to a mean annual wind 
speed higher than 5.1 m/s at 10 meters above ground. The realistic potential assumes that just 4 percent 
of that land area could be used. 
6 The official energy statistics from the US Government 
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2.1.2 Political Interests and Pressure 
Although there was interest in renewable energies in the 1960s and 1970s, the first major 
political boost came when the UN World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) brought the concept of sustainable development to the political agenda with the 
report Our Common Future (WCED 1987). The report tried to strike a balance between 
environment and development, North and South, and between the present and the future. In 
terms of energy, the WCED recommended reducing resource- and energy-intensive activities, 
using resources and energy more efficiently, and changing production and consumption 
patterns. As a follow up to the WCED report, the UN General Assembly decided to hold 
regional conferences and a global conference. Thus, the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The conference adopted 
Agenda 21, a comprehensive, international plan of action to achieve more sustainable patterns 
of development. Agenda 21 reached the conclusion that the energy course was unsustainable 
and recommended a series of concrete actions to promote sustainable energy production and 
use (UNDP 1997). 
Greenhouse gas emissions and the issue of climate change were dealt with extensively at 
the 1992 Rio Conference, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was signed at the conference. Although the UNFCCC does not include 
stabilization commitments, quantified targets or timetables, it laid the basis for the 
development of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol requires most developed 
countries to reduce their GHG emissions by 5.2 percent relative to 1990 levels in the period 
2008-2012. The development of renewable energy sources should benefit from the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, as the GHG emissions from electricity produced from 
fossil fuels would incur an additional cost. As a follow-up to the Rio conference, the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development took place in Johannesburg in 2002. In June 2004, the 
World Renewable Energy Conference in Bonn was held as a response to the call of the 
Johannesburg summit for the global development of renewable energies. The central issue 
was how to increase the share of renewable energy technologies for power generation in 
industrialized and developing countries. This should be done in ways that better exploited 
their relative strengths and capacities to meet the future needs of consumers. The current 
preparation for the follow-up of the Bonn conference is to hold a ministerial renewable 
conference in Beijing in November 2005. It is expected that further political commitments 
could be made through this event.  
It is clear that political leaders have been inspired by these major events but also from 
public opinion and NGO involvement. The trend for sustainable energy development has 
become mainstreamed in political agendas also at the national level, in both developed and 
developing countries. At the World Renewable Energy Conference in Bonn, a number of 
concrete actions and commitments towards renewable energy were put forward by a large 
number of governments, international organizations and stakeholders from civil society and 
the private sector, known as the International Action Programme.7 
2.1.3 Concerns about the Natural Environment 
The most obvious driver for renewable energy from the environmental perspective is the 
concern about increased concentrations of GHG and the resulting climate change effects. 
Fossil fuel combustion is the primary source of CO2 emissions, and the resulting global 
warming represents a major challenge to human society and global eco-systems. However, 
the combustion of fossil fuels has also consequences for local and regional pollution, as it 
                                                     
7 China pledged to significantly increase renewable energy power generation so that it will account for 
10 percent of its generating capacity by 2010. Countries such as Germany, Denmark, Egypt, and the 
Philippines also made significant commitments. 
 
CICERO Report 2005:03  
Green Electricity Market Development 
 
 
 
 
7
emits sulfur and nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide and suspended particulate matter. At the 
local level, fossil fuel combustion is a major contributor to urban air pollution, which is 
thought to contribute to millions of illness- and mortality incidents around the world. Coal 
mining activities result in soil erosion, pollution and often in the loss of human lives due to 
mine accidents. At the regional level, soil acidification is causing significant damage to 
natural systems, crops, and human-made structures. These pollutants are shown to cause 
considerable health and other ecological damages in Europe, the USA, and China (WWF 
China 2003). Using renewable energy sources would result in significantly less negative 
environmental and health impacts, especially by replacing electricity produced from coal 
(Goldemberg 2004, Aunan et al. 2004).  
 
2.1.4 Technology Development 
The high costs of R&D but generally also the costs per kWh, combined with an insufficient 
scale of development are often seen as the principal constraints on the growth of renewable 
energy technologies. But substantial technological development and cost reductions have 
made several renewable energy technologies more competitive. Despite these gains, 
renewable energy sources so far make only a modest contribution to the global production of 
electricity (IEA 2002). In a study by McVeigh et al. 1999, the actual performance of 
renewable energy technologies in the USA over three decades was compared against stated 
projections. The study found that, in general, renewable technologies failed to meet 
expectations with respect to market penetration. However, they succeeded in meeting or 
exceeding expectations with respect to their costs. The small market share of renewables 
appears to have more to do with changes outside their own development, principally 
regulatory reform and changes in conventional technologies (declining real prices of fossil 
based power), than with their technological performance. 
Neuhoff (2004) distinguishes between three distinct generations of renewable energy 
technologies, each presenting different, complex challenges to expansion of their markets. 
The mature generation (hydropower, biomass combustion, wind power, solar thermal 
utilization and geothermal technologies) are already cost-competitive, provided the renewable 
plants are located in high quality resource areas. The emerging generation (advanced 
bioenergy, and solar PV) are proven technically, but still need substantial cost reduction 
through market expansion. Concentrated solar power, thin-film technology, ocean energy, and 
even more advanced bioenergy will require substantial R&D in order for these technologies 
prove themselves at the market scale and to begin entry into commercial markets applications. 
With a larger market dissemination and increased cumulative installed capacity of 
renewable energies, economies of scale could lower costs and accelerate demand. Predicting 
the future costs of electricity from renewable energy sources is difficult, but there are 
estimates. Table 2.2 combines Turkenburg’s assessment of current costs and IEA’s 
assessment of likely cost reductions. Although the estimates can vary depending on site 
conditions, the study reports cost reductions of 10-15 percent for bioenergy, 15-30 percent for 
onshore and offshore wind energy, 30-50 percent for solar PV energy, and 10 percent for 
geothermal and hydropower by 2020.  
Countries that have the political will and willingness of the industry have been able to build 
up industries for renewable energy technologies. Such examples are Denmark and Germany 
for wind technologies, Sweden and Finland for biomass CHP, Japan, Germany and to some 
extent USA for solar PV application in buildings. This has led to social benefits, e.g. 
employment, but also brings economic benefits as shown by the export of wind turbines from 
Denmark and Germany. 
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Table 2.2 Current and Potential Future Costs of Electricity from Renewable Energy 
 Current cost8 Cost reductions by 2020 
Biomass 3-12 ¢kWh 10-15% 
Wind 4-8 ¢kWh 15-30% 
Solar PV 25-160 ¢kWh 30-50% 
Geothermal 2-10 ¢kWh 10% 
Hydro 2-12 ¢kWh 10% 
Source: Turkenburg 2001, IEA 2001b 
 
2.1.5 Economic Driver 
Energy prices are important considerations for energy supply and demand. The costs of 
renewable energies are not fully comparable to conventional energies because of the latters’ 
externalities, but it is clear that the price of conventional energies affect the demand for 
electricity from renewable energy sources. An early sign of this is the disruption of oil 
supplies and consequently the rising prices of oil and other fossil fuels in the mid-1970s and 
1980s that stimulated the interest in renewable energies. Figure 2.1 shows that crude oil 
prices have become much more volatile since the mid-1990s.  
 
Source: IEA 2002. 
Figure 2.1 Monthly Average Spot Price of Brent Blend Crude Oil (1987-2002) 
 
From 1987 to 1996, the monthly average spot price of Brent Blend crude oil fluctuated 
between US$13 and US$22 per barrel in nominal terms. The exception is 1996, when the 
price reached about US$35 per barrel as a result of the first Gulf War. Since 1996, the 
monthly average spot prices have fluctuated over a wider range, from a low of under US$10 
in February 1999 to a high of US$33 in the autumn of 2000 (IEA 2002). Since then, the 
monthly average spot price gradually fluctuated down to about US$20 in early 2002 but has 
increased to reach US$50 in the autumn of 2004.9 IEA finds that unless surplus capacity in 
                                                     
8 Euro cent 
9 There were days when the spot price reached US$52 per barrel (EIA 2004a). 
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crude oil production and refining increases, markets will remain sensitive to actual or feared 
swings or disruptions in supply. Geopolitics and regional conflicts also affect oil prices. 
Even though oil is the most important energy source, coal remains the most important fuel 
for electricity generation. Coal trade, especially seaborne trade in hard coal, has on average 
increased by around 4 percent a year since 1970. The growth is dominated by the trade in 
steaming coal, which is used mainly for electricity generation. The main reason for coal’s 
dominating role in the production of electricity has been its low and stable, even slightly 
decreasing prices and transportation costs (WEC 2004). Between 1995 and 2002, many new 
mines were developed specifically for the export market and resulted in a upward pressure on 
prices due to strong market demand. With lower growth in production capacity and more 
transparent coal markets, price cycles have become more frequent. A large part of the recent 
price increases for steam coal have been driven by freight cost increases (CIAB 2004). Long-
term price projection for coal is very difficult, and forecasts tend to be inaccurate (Gawlick 
2004). Nevertheless, if the current high oil and coal prices prevail, it will stimulate the 
development of alternative energy sources.  
2.2  Major Barriers to Market Development 
Although there are certain driving forces that would seem to encourage the production of 
energy from renewable energy sources, Table 2.1 shows that renewable energy still accounts 
for only a small share of total electricity production. Cost is widely seen as the main barrier 
for the development of renewable energy sources (see section 2.1), but in the following 
section we briefly discuss some of the other major barriers to green electricity policy and 
market development. 
2.2.1 Deregulation and Lower Electricity Prices 
The deregulation of electricity markets has led to increased competition in the market both 
because producers have to compete for market shares and because consumers have the 
opportunity to choose their source of electricity. Increased competition in electricity markets 
may, however, have a negative effect on green electricity development and on the 
environment, as the fossil fuel prices become lower. While there is evidence that consumers 
in the USA are willing to pay a premium to obtain electricity produced from renewable 
sources, customers with the opportunity to choose their source of electricity may choose 
among sources according to price and environmental externalities. Utilities facing competitive 
pressures have an incentive to turn to the cheapest source of electricity generation consistent 
with pollution control regulations. Since electricity costs do not typically reflect all 
environmental costs, sources that offer the lowest cost could be those that result in the most 
pollution. To the extent that prices for electricity produced from renewable technologies more 
fully capture external costs than prices for electricity from conventional sources, cleaner 
renewable electricity technologies would be at a disadvantage relative to conventional 
technologies in restructured, competitive markets. Furthermore, renewable electricity 
technologies are generally characterized by relatively high capital costs and low operation and 
maintenance costs, making them more attractive over long time horizons and less attractive to 
firms facing short-term competitive pressures (Menz 2004).   
2.2.2 Potential Conflict Between Policy Instruments 
The review of the case studies shows that there are numerous policy instruments, both 
financial and non-financial, that can be used to promote the development of green electricity. 
However, mixing policy instruments can lead to different incentives working in different 
directions with respect to the chosen technologies.  
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2.2.3 Lack of Political Will and Institutional Arrangements  
It has been widely recognized that strong political will from concerned governments on green 
power development is key to the successful development of renewables. Political will has 
played an important role in Germany, for instance, where wind power has become 
mainstreamed in industrial sectors, and substantial production capacity in wind turbines 
power plants has been built in some 10 years. This would be unthinkable without strong 
political comments and associated policy support. It can be generalized that political 
willingness to support green power development is a precondition for green power industrial 
development. Agreements are needed among key parties, including agreements on visions for 
long-term development, and on concrete regulatory and incentive policies. Thus, institutional 
arrangements also need to be in place to facilitate such agreements, resolve disputes and 
implement policies. It appears that central government coordination is important for the 
decision-making and policy implementation processes. Substantial human resources 
arrangements are also critical.     
2.2.4 Stochastic Supply, Grid Capacity and Access 
Hydropower without storage, wind power, and various forms of solar and wave energy are by 
nature stochastic and result in an uncertain electricity production. This creates difficulty in 
ensuring electricity supply. There will therefore be a need for a back up (spinning reserve), 
but this increases the cost. Because of the intermittent nature of, for example, wind resources, 
it is better suited to supplement rather than replace the more traditional forms of power 
production (coal, natural gas and nuclear). Transmission policies that impose stringent 
scheduling requirements or otherwise fail to accommodate the characteristics of the 
generation resources may result in implicit discrimination against non-traditional resources 
such as wind (AWEA 2002).  
The lack of capacity and access to the electricity grid can also limit green electricity market 
development. Taking wind power as an example, transporting electricity produced from a 
large offshore wind farm to land is economically feasible only where sufficient electricity grid 
capacity is available. Since wind resources are typically remote from load centers, the 
development of wind generation requires development of associated long-distance 
transmission lines that reach those locations (AWEA 2002). But it is not only a question of 
grid capacity. Electric utilities often maintain monopoly rights to produce, transmit and 
distribute electricity. High costs or a lack of standards for connection and transmission hence 
discourage the penetration of renewable energy sources in electricity markets. Renewable 
energy sources in distributed generation involve the use of small, modular electricity 
generation units close to the point of resource consumption location. Unfortunately, utilities 
have limited experience in connecting numerous small-scale generation units to their 
distribution networks, and the possible level of renewables penetration depends strongly on 
the existing electrical infrastructure (EREC 2004).  
2.2.5 Resistance from Fossil Fuel Based Industries 
Commercial utilization of fossil fuels has been the main source of power supply from the time 
of modern history, particularly from the Industrial Revolution. Coal became the main source 
of fuel in the 17th century, and was joined by oil and natural gas in the 20th century. 
Consequently, industrial infrastructure (coal mines, oil fields, power plants, transmission 
lines, oil and gas pipe lines, machinery production, and transportation systems) are all built to 
serve the needs of the fossil fuel industries. Fossil fuel and related technologies are mature 
and inexpensive due to large quantities in production, and stakes are high for producers along 
the value chain in those industries. As fossil fuel prices are still cheap in the world markets, 
these industries have been able to develop a strong power base and lobbying power to 
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governments in major industrialized countries10 and key developing countries such as China 
and India. Their vested interests mean that certain policy reforms can be met by strong 
opposition. Many small stakeholders can participate in the development of green power 
generation, and they tend to be decentralized and fulfill local demands. Decentralized 
renewable power generation is certainly not in the interest of major fossil fuel power 
industries,11 as it can reshape the structure of the conventional power industry.  
2.2.6 Weak Consumer Awareness and Support 
Renewable energy sources are often supported by the public. But even though consumers now 
have a better opportunity to choose their source of electricity, weak consumer awareness and 
inability to purchase green electricity may pose barriers. Experience from the United States 
shows that consumers who have purchased green products through financial incentive 
programs generally have a long-standing interest in renewable energy and are strongly 
motivated by non-economic factors, including environmental concerns, a desire to reduce 
dependence on utilities, and national security threats. Until recently, most US electricity 
customers have not been able to participate in green electricity markets, and currently that 
opportunity is limited to electricity customers in about 30 states (Menz 2004). An important 
factor influencing consumer interest is naturally the price of green electricity but also the 
focus on this in the mass media. An analysis of utility market research studies (Farhar 1999) 
shows that across the studies examined, majorities of 52 to 95 percent said they were willing 
to pay at least a modest amount more per month on their electric bills for power from 
renewable sources. Polls show that customers’ willingness to pay increases when customers 
are educated about utility energy options. Information and education are important, and the 
media can play an important role. 
2.2.7 Lack of NGO Involvement 
Environmental NGOs can play an active role in promoting green electricity market 
development. In Sweden, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) was 
instrumental in initiating a number of environmental schemes and guidelines. The aim of their 
labeling scheme was to speed up the conversion from nuclear power and fossil fuels to 
renewable energy sources and to prevent the continued expansion of hydroelectric power 
stations (Wang 2004). In the Netherlands, WWF has been instrumental in mobilizing the 
support from the mass media in the green electricity campaign. Similarly, German NGOs 
have been active in launching three competing eco-labeling schemes.12 However, there is still 
a lack of strong NGO presence and influence in green power development. Many 
environmental NGOs are limited by their expertise, financial constraints and lobbying power. 
There are few incentive mechanisms to encourage their participation from the government’s 
side.   
                                                     
10 For example, the oil and coal industries have been successful in lobbying the U.S. government to 
block the progress of the Kyoto Protocol, and have prevented the government from making any 
commitment on CO2 emissions reduction in the U.S.  
 
11 This has been the case in the formation process of the Renewable Energy Law in China. Major 
power companies tried to block the discussion on quota obligations for renewable energy production.   
12 Eco-labelling does not appear to be a strong positive driver for green electricity marketing in 
Germany so far. This is because competing eco-labels counteract the basic function of an eco-label to 
reduce complexity and give guidance to consumers, and because they have a high level of 
sophistication in distinguishing green power from EEG-supported electricity. 
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2.3 Status and Outlook in the Case-study Countries 
The status of green electricity in the case-study countries is summarized in Table 2.3. 
Including hydropower, almost half of Sweden’s electricity production in 2002 came from 
renewables, while the other countries’ share of renewables ranged from 4 to 9 percent. 
Excluding hydropower reduces the share of renewables to 2-4 percent in all four countries. 
More details are found in the following sections. 
 
Table 2.3 Share of Green Electricity Production in the Case Study Countries (2002) 
percent green electricity  
Country with hydro without hydro 
 
Energy source ranked by importance 
Germany 7.8 3.8 Hydro, wind, biomass, solar 
Netherlands13 4.0 3.9 Biomass, wind, hydro, solar 
Sweden 49.0 3.0 Hydro, biomass, wind, solar 
USA 8.8 2.2 Hydro, biomass, wind, thermal, solar 
Sources: Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2004; Eurostat 2004; Dutch Government 2003; Wang 2004; Menz 
2004. 
 
2.3.1 Germany 
Germany relies heavily on coal and nuclear power, which account for 50.6 percent and 28.3 
percent of electricity production, respectively, in 2002. Natural gas makes up 9.3 percent, and 
the share of renewables in electricity generation has almost tripled from 2.8 percent (15 TWh) 
in 1991 to 7.8 percent (46 TWh) in 2002. Hydropower is currently the most important energy 
source for green electricity consumption in Germany, as it accounted for about 4 percent in 
2002. Growth in hydropower has been relatively limited in recent years, and the number of 
large hydropower plants has been stable over the past few decades. A number of small 
hydropower plants (< 5 MW) were decommissioned throughout the 20th century, but the 
trend has been reversed due to the introduction of the feed-in law in 1991. Refurbishment of 
existing hydropower plants with careful environmental impact management looks like the 
most promising option in terms of increasing electricity production with hydropower 
(Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2004). 
Three percent of the electricity consumption in 2002 came from wind power. Starting from 
only 27 MW installed capacity in 1989, wind power has seen an almost 60 percent compound 
annual growth rate for 13 consecutive years. In 2002, the installed capacity for wind power in 
Germany exceeded 12,000 MW, representing about half of the capacity in Europe and more 
than one third worldwide. Biomass accounted for less than 1 percent of electricity 
consumption in 2002. However, biomass CHP has become a high priority from 2004. Several 
players have announced plans to build new power plants using solid biomass. Identifying a 
continuous flow of resources within a useful proximity is crucial for competitive operation of 
larger biomass plants (5-20 MW). Photovoltaics (PV) have a small market share in Germany 
with about 0.03 percent of electricity consumption in 2002. However, growth rates have been 
very high, about 50 percent annually, throughout the decade. In terms of installed capacity, 
Germany ranked second behind Japan at the end of 2003. Geothermal energy has so far only 
been used for heat supply and not for electricity generation.14 Eight pilot and demonstration 
plants are currently being planned, and geothermal electricity generation has a technical 
                                                     
13 Statistics from Eurostat and the Dutch Government used instead of van Rooijen and van Wees (2003) 
as it does not report figures for 2002. 
14 Only exception is a small geothermal power plant in North-Eastern Germany. 
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potential that is comparable with PV and onshore wind energy (Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 
2004). 
Further growth is expected, particularly in wind energy, PV and biomass. A study 
commissioned by the German Ministry of Environment and Environmental Agency finds that 
wind (onshore and offshore) and solar energy have long-term technical potential to generate 
250 TWh of electricity per year (more than 40 percent of German electricity consumption in 
2002). In a scenario aiming at 80 percent CO2 reduction by 2050, the Environmental Agency 
estimates that 63 percent of the electricity will be generated from renewable energy sources. It 
is expected that 46 percent will come from domestic generation, while 17 percent will be 
covered by imports (Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2004).  
The liberalization of the electricity market in 1998 is important, as it became possible for 
customers to directly influence the way their electricity is made. Initial price competition led 
to an erosion of profit margins and a wave of mergers and acquisitions. New green power 
marketers introduced products while incumbent utilities repositioned their programs for the 
newly competitive market environment (Bird et al. 2002). Today, more than 135 marketers 
supply 1,700 GWh of green power to an estimated 490,000 customers in Germany. This 
represents a market share of about 1.3 percent of residential customers. A survey 
(Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2004) among German green power suppliers estimates that 127 
MW of new capacity has been created as a result of green power demand between 1999 and 
2003. They find that green power marketing driven by customer demand is growing but has 
had limited measurable impact so far. However, scenario analysis for the next ten years 
suggests that green power marketing could come close to driving half of the new capacity in 
2013. 
2.3.2 The Netherlands 
The Dutch electricity sector has since the 1970s been dominated by natural gas, coal and oil. 
In 2002, these energy sources accounted for about 92 percent of the electricity production 
while nuclear energy accounted for 4 percent. Renewable energy sources accounted for 3,644 
TWh or 4 percent of the Dutch electricity production in 2002. Green electricity production 
increased by 21 percent from 2001 and by 39 percent compared to 2000. Almost 70 percent of 
the green electricity production in 2002 came from biomass, accounting for 2,535 TWh and 
2.8 percent of the total electricity production. One percent of the total electricity came from 
wind energy, while hydropower, PV and thermal energy accounted for only 0.14 percent, 0.06 
percent and 0.02 percent, respectively. The Netherlands requires import to meet the demand 
for electricity. In 2002, electricity imports amounted to 20.9 TWh, and of this, 10.35 TWh 
were considered green. This represents a significant increase from the green electricity 
imports of 7.6 TWh in 2001 and 1.5 TWh in 2000 (van Damme and Zwart 2003). Taking 
import into account, green electricity accounted for 9.9 percent and 12.9 percent of the total 
electricity consumed in 2001 and 2002, respectively. 
Installed onshore wind electricity capacity in the Netherlands amounted to 466 MW in 
2000. A review of the literature for onshore wind potential shows that the technical potential 
could be as high as 6 GW, but most studies assume at least 2.5–3 GW. Given various 
constraints, 1.5–2.2 GW is considered a reasonable target for 2010. Offshore placement of 
wind turbines has recently become an important option. The long-term technical potential on 
the Dutch continental shelf has been estimated to be between 10 and 56 GW. A realizable 
potential for 2020 has been estimated at 6-10 GW, and the government target for 2020 is 6 
GW (Junginger et al. 2004; de Noord et al. 2004). 
The Dutch hydropower capacity in 2000 was 37 MW, consisting of 2 MW generated from 
small hydro plants and 35 MW from large hydro. The technical potential for hydropower in 
the Netherlands is small. Hydropower technology is fully mature, and minimal cost 
reductions and efficiency improvements are expected. The technical potential is estimated to 
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be about 100 MW, while the economic potential is estimated at 53-56 MW (Junginger et al. 
2004; de Noord et al. 2004). Electricity produced from domestic biomass and organic waste 
accounted in 2000 for 40 PJth.15 In scenario studies for 2020, the range is 44-166 PJth while 
the best guess ranges from 65-75 PJth (Junginger et al. 2004). The installed PV capacity in the 
Netherlands was 20.5 MWp16 in 2001. For 2020, the realizable potential is reported to range 
from 35 to 8,000 MWp (de Noord et al. 2004) and from 16 to 2,000 MWp with a best guess at 
580 MWp (Junginger et al. 2004).   
Green electricity entered the Dutch electricity system during the 1990s, with the strongest 
increase in the second half of the 1990s (Dinica and Arentsen 2003). Green electricity has 
then been offered by all 12 electricity distribution companies since 1999, and sales grew 
considerably in late 1999 with the help of a marketing and media campaign launched by the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Just before the liberalization of the green consumer 
market in July 2001, there was heavy advertising by utilities hoping to increase customer 
loyalty. This, combined with tax exemptions for green electricity, fuelled the demand. Since 
1996, the number of green consumers has increased from 16,000 to 1.4 million in 2003. This 
sharp increase in demand is the result of the financial support measures (for consumers, the 
price difference between green and conventional grey electricity was, in effect, zero), 
combined with market liberalization and the media campaign promoted by environmental 
NGOs. Anticipating future full liberalization of the electricity market, electricity companies 
have used green electricity as a marketing tool to attract new customers and retain existing 
ones. 
Two main targets have been set for the green electricity market in the Netherlands. In its 
third white paper on energy from 1995, the Dutch government formulated a policy goal of 10 
percent renewable energy of total energy supply in 2020. The main emphasis was put on 
electricity from renewable sources, and a target of 17 percent contribution to the domestic 
electricity consumption was set. In line with the target formulated in the EU directive on 
renewable electricity, the Dutch government formulated an intermediate target of 9 percent 
contribution to electricity consumption from renewables in 2010. Studies have indicated that 
these goals may not be reached by domestic production only, and that import of green 
electricity may be needed to reach the targets. Nonetheless, there is still a potential for 
increased production of green electricity in the Netherlands (Junginger et al. 2004). 
2.3.3 Sweden 
Electricity production in Sweden has been and still is dominated by hydropower and nuclear 
energy. In 2002, 46 percent of the total electricity produced came from hydropower, while 
nuclear energy accounted for 45.7 percent. The current share of renewable energy in Sweden 
remains small, and biomass and wind are the main renewable energy sources. Their 
contribution to the electricity production in 2002 is 2.6 percent and 0.4 percent respectively 
(Wang 2004). 
Nuclear energy increased substantially after the first oil crisis in the early seventies, when 
the production was 1.4 TWh (or 2%, in 1972). Nuclear energy in production terms peaked in 
1991 with 73.5 TWh, and its significance for electricity production peaked in 1996, 
accounting for 52.3 percent (SEA 2003). Nuclear power has been discussed in Sweden for 
decades, and political decisions have been made to decommission the nuclear power plants. 
Concern for industrial competitiveness has, however, hindered firm actions so far. To date 
there is still a lack of national consensus on the approach and timeframe of the phase-out of 
nuclear power. This dilemma has resulted in a lack of strong government commitment 
towards the development of renewable energy, which is reflected in the short-term nature of 
                                                     
15 PJ heat production 
16 MW at peak power (PV functioning in optimal sunlight). 
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the subsidy programs for the renewable energy sources. In addition, CO2 policies have not 
been an additional incentive for promoting renewables, as the Swedish energy sector is 
already almost carbon free (Wang 2004). 
Hydropower has dominated the electricity production in Sweden, accounting for more than 
75 percent in the early 1970s. Production in 1970 was 40.9 TWh; it peaked in 2000 with 77.8 
TWh, and was 66.0 TWh in 2002 (SEA 2003). The majority of this is from large hydropower 
stations, but there are also around 1200 small hydropower stations that together generate 
around 1.5 TWh of electricity. Despite the fact that Sweden has rich water resources, future 
expansion of hydropower is, however, limited due to the legislated protection of the few 
remaining large rivers. Small hydropower is controversial because of environmental impacts 
in the small streams concerned. Thus biomass and wind power are clearly the most important 
renewable sources of energy in Sweden so far in terms of resources, policy efforts and 
impacts (Wang 2004). 
The use of biomass (biofuels and peat) in conventional thermal power plants was 3.8 TWh, 
or 2.6 percent of the total electricity production in 2002. Sweden has the second largest peat 
resources in Western Europe (after Finland) as well as large forest resources. The largest 
sources of biofuels are wood fuels (logs, bark, chips and energy forest), black liquors in pulp 
mills, peat, refuse, straw and energy grasses. It is estimated that, by 2010, the potential for the 
use of biofuels in Sweden will be about 160 TWh (Wang 2004). 
Sweden’s first wind power plant with an installed capacity of 3 MW came in 1982. The 
number of wind power plants has steadily increased, and by 2002 there were 620 wind power 
plants with an installed capacity of 345 MW and a production of 609 GWh (0.4 % of the total 
electricity generation). Wind energy is the fastest growing renewable electricity resource in 
Sweden, as the installed capacity and the production nearly doubled from 1997 to 2002. Wind 
power is one of the main options for renewable electricity production for Sweden. In recent 
years, there has been more focus on identifying concrete sites for onshore and offshore wind 
power. The Swedish Energy Agency has suggested a target of 10 TWh of wind electricity by 
2015, and concludes in a report that the potential may be around 100-200 TWh. A large share 
of the potential production will have to come from offshore installations, considering conflicts 
of interests for land-based wind power (Wang 2004). 
Electricity production from solar PV is negligible in today’s Swedish energy system. There 
have been some R&D programs for PV, but Sweden lacks market development initiatives and 
subsidy programs such as feed-in tariffs or roof-top programs that have led to a direct 
promotion of PV in countries such as Germany and Japan. However, the interest from the 
industry, architects and building companies to integrate solar PV systems in buildings are 
growing, and awareness of the advantage with PV system is increasing (Wang 2004). 
Competition was introduced into the Swedish electricity market in January 1996. Since 
then, all end-users are free to choose their electricity suppliers. The liberalization of the 
Swedish electricity market provides straightforward access for small independent generators 
to be connected to the grid, and all consumers have access to green power. With the 
liberalized electricity market, the SSNC introduced a green label, called “Bra Miljöval” 
(Good Environmental Choice). SSNC, being Sweden’s largest NGO, has been able to initiate 
a number of environmental schemes and guidelines in the past. The objective of the voluntary 
labeling scheme for green electricity was to speed up the shift from nuclear power and fossil 
fuels to renewable energy sources and to prevent the continued expansion of hydroelectric 
power stations. The labeling scheme gave customers the opportunity to pay a levy on their 
electric bill to cover the incremental cost of producing electricity from renewable sources. 
The labeling scheme has been successful. In 1996, the amount of environmentally labeled 
electricity sold already amounted to 3 percent of total generated electricity. The share of green 
electricity demand continued to grow to 10 percent in 2001 (Wang 2004). However, a 
significant portion of the sales is to non-residential customers, such as commercial and 
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industrial customers and public agencies. There has been little interest among residential 
customers so far. Furthermore, very little new renewable capacity has been installed to meet 
demand. Most of the green products are from hydro projects installed before 1996, and only 5 
percent of the power supplied is from new renewables (Bird et al. 2002). 
2.3.4 USA 
The United States relies heavily on non-renewable fossil fuels for most of its energy needs. 
Coal and nuclear power have been responsible for about two-thirds of net electricity 
generation for the last several decades. Coal is the principal energy source used for electricity 
production and has accounted for more than 50 percent since 1980. Given the abundance of 
coal reserves, the US Department of Energy expects coal to account for nearly 50 percent of 
net electric generation in 2025. Nuclear power generation increased by 35 percent between 
1990 and 2002, and has consistently accounted for about 20 percent of total electricity 
generated over that period. Nuclear powers’s share of total electricity production is expected 
to fall to less than 15 percent in 2025 because of the public concerns about the safety of 
nuclear power plants and difficulties in dealing with radioactive waste. Natural gas has been 
used to generate a steadily increasing share of net electricity since the late 1980s because it is 
both relatively abundant and cleaner than other fossil fuels for electricity production. Natural 
gas is expected to contribute nearly 30 percent of net electricity production in 2025 (Menz 
2004). 
The share of net electricity generation produced from renewable sources (including 
hydropower) declined from nearly 12 percent in 1990 to about 9 percent in 2002. The decline 
was mainly caused by a drop in hydroelectric production. The production of electricity from 
other renewable sources has been virtually constant in relative terms for the last several years, 
accounting for 2.2 percent of total electricity production in 2002. Electricity generation from 
non-hydropower renewable energy sources is expected to increase to 3.3 percent in 2025 
(EIA 2003). Hydroelectric power is the major renewable source of electricity and was 
responsible for 6.6 percent of total electricity generation and about three-fourths of electricity 
produced from all renewable sources in 2002. More than 90 percent comes from conventional 
large-scale and pumped storage facilities operated by electric utilities. Because virtually all of 
the nation’s hydropower capacity is currently utilized, the share of electricity generated by 
conventional hydroelectric facilities is expected to decline to 5.2 percent of total generation in 
2025 (EIA 2003).  
Biomass has been the second largest source of renewable electricity and was responsible 
for 17 percent of electricity from all renewable sources in 2002. Wood and agricultural waste 
currently make up more than two-thirds of biomass capacity. Electricity generation from 
biomass is expected to more than double between 2001 and 2025. Wind energy is the fastest 
growing renewable electricity resource in the United States. From 1997 to 2002, generation 
from wind sources increased from 3,288 million kilowatt hours (kWh) to 10,354 million 
kWh, and wind power accounted for 3.0 percent of electricity produced from all renewable 
sources in 2002. The amount of solar electricity produced in the United States increased 
slightly from 1997 to 2002, when it accounted for just 0.15 percent of electricity produced 
from renewable sources. The relatively high cost of solar energy remains a key impediment, 
particularly in grid-integrated applications. Geothermal electricity production in the United 
States has declined consistently since 1992, and accounted for 2.2 percent of electricity 
generated by renewable sources in 2002. Geothermal electricity generation is expected to 
increase and comprise 0.6 percent of total electricity generation by 2025. 
In a recent study, the Union of Concerned Scientists estimates that major renewable 
resources excluding hydropower – wind, solar, biomass (excluding municipal solid waste), 
geothermal, and landfill gas – could potentially provide 5.6 times the total amount of 
electricity used in the country in 2001.  Wind power has the greatest potential, and could have 
met over 400 percent of the nation’s electricity needs in 2001. Estimated potentials for other 
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renewable sources as a percentage of 2001 electricity sales were solar (photovoltaic), 71 
percent; biomass (natural materials only), 24 percent; geothermal, 6 percent; and landfill gas, 
1 percent (Menz 2004). 
The development of renewables across the states is uneven. While hydropower is produced 
in almost every state of the country, the Pacific states (Washington, Oregon, and California) 
account for about 60 percent of total hydroelectric production in the United States. As of 
2000, wind power’s share of total electricity produced from renewable sources was greatest in 
Iowa (33 percent), Minnesota (24 percent), Texas (19 percent), and California (5.8 percent). 
States with the highest portion of their total renewable electricity from wood/wood waste are 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, Georgia, and Maine. Support at the state level is strong, but 
there is considerable variation among states in both their regulatory environments and the 
policies that have been implemented to promote green electricity (Menz 2004). The lack of 
political commitment on reducing GHG emissions in the USA seems to have become a major 
barrier to developing substantial federal policies. 
3 Comparison of Green Electricity Policies 
This chapter discusses government policies and policy instruments that can be used to 
promote green electricity development. Special attention will be given to effects of policies 
implemented in the case-study countries and the institutional dynamics of green electricity 
markets. Section 3.1 presents policy objectives; Section 3.2 presents categories of policies and 
policy instruments and the evaluation criteria. Section 3.3 addresses institutional aspects of 
policy development in the case-study countries; Section 3.4 analyses the policies and 
instruments applied in the four case-study countries and evaluates their effects in the policy 
implementation processes; Section 3.5 compares the policies and policy instruments and 
assesses their advantages and disadvantages in practical application. 
3.1 Policy Objectives 
What makes electricity “green” in a given context relates of course to policy objectives, and 
there is therefore scope for different answers. If the objective is strictly to mitigate global 
warming, for instance, then it would be natural to include nuclear power in the ‘green’ (or 
favored-policy) category. Similarly, from broad environmental objectives, many would 
exclude large hydropower facilities from the ‘green’ category. Sweeping references are 
typically made to two related but different policy objectives, namely greenhouse gas 
mitigation and energy security. A study by the IEA (2004) finds that little attention has 
traditionally been given to the possible connection between these two policy objectives. 
However, with climate change becoming an increasingly important factor, more attention has 
been paid to adopting an integrated approach in recent national energy policy plans. This 
trend is exemplified by the recent EU Directive 2001/77/EC on renewable energy sources, 
known as the “RES Directive”.17 The purpose of the RES Directive is to increase the 
contribution of renewable energy sources to electricity production. Promotion of renewable 
energy sources is seen as a priority measure given that their exploitation contributes to 
environmental protection and sustainable development. In addition, their exploitation can also 
create local employment, have a positive impact on social cohesion, contribute to energy 
security, and help meet the GHG emissions reduction requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                     
17 EU 2001. Other examples are: The National Energy Policy Development Group for the USA (the 
White House 2001), recent white papers on energy policy in both the UK (DTI 2003) and France 
(MINEFI 2003), as well as in other OECD countries and at EU level through the European 
Commission green paper on energy security (EU 2000). 
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Table 3.1 illustrates how the GHG mitigation and energy security objectives could translate 
into different policy instruments. A few lessons can be drawn from the table. The first is that 
the delimitations of both the activities to be addressed and the chosen policy instrument 
depend critically on the objective pursued. Second, neither of these objectives relate 
specifically to electricity production, but rather more broadly to activities in energy 
production, consumption, and even beyond. This means that the fundamentally interesting 
domain for intervention is broader than the electricity sector, but instruments applied 
specifically for the sector could, as a part of a broader package, of course be advisable for 
administrative or other reasons.  
Table 3.1 Relation Between Policy Objective, Desired Influence, and Instrument18 
Objective: Textbook 
intervention 
point 
(example) 
Ideal 
influence 
(roughly) 
Textbook 
instrument 
Observed 
instrument 
(example) 
Main margin of 
influence 
(judgment) 
GHG 
mitigation 
Global 
emissions, 
according to 
Global Warming 
Potential (GWP) 
Demand and 
supply 
behavior, 
sectoral 
balances, 
technology 
Global and 
uniform 
GWP tax, or 
tradable 
quotas   
Tradable CO2 
quotas and 
CO2 tax, some 
sectors, some 
countries 
Fuel 
substitution, 
energy 
conservation 
Energy 
security 
Develop 
national energy 
sources with 
uncorrelated 
risks. R&D and 
real investments 
for energy 
conservation 
Demand: 
energy 
conservation. 
For Norway: 
non-rain 
energy, 
transmission; 
for US: non-
Middle East, 
non-oil 
US: Oil 
import tax; 
alternative 
energy 
subsidy. 
Norway: 
Hydro tax, 
non-hydro 
subsidy 
Conservation 
subsidies, 
R&D 
subsidies, 
strategic oil 
reserves (US). 
Home insulation, 
hydrogen and 
fusion 
technology, 
calm markets  
  
Third, while the objective of GHG mitigation has a truly global ideal intervention point 
(broadly speaking, mitigation is equally valuable independent of where it happens),19 energy 
security represents different desirable interventions in different parts of the world. Energy 
security for countries such as Norway would traditionally mean access to electricity in 
protracted periods (a year and longer) with low precipitation. But it could also mean increased 
transmission capacity with neighboring countries. For other countries like the USA and in 
continental Europe, nuclear, natural gas, coal and domestic oil (including reserves) can 
cushion their vulnerability to shortages in oil imports. Fourth, an instrument geared to pursue 
one objective is likely to be poorly suited to pursue another. Now, intervention with some 
policy instruments is quite costly – including administratively – so it could be that a strategy 
for an important objective does well enough in pursuing another.  
As a practical interpretation for this report, we shall mainly understand the policy objective 
as increasing the share of renewable energy sources in electricity production. By focusing on 
production, a country would want to increase the share of renewables in electricity production 
                                                     
18 Authors’ illustration of how different objectives would lead to different interventions and effects. 
Instruments such as feed-in tariffs for green electricity (Germany) and green electricity certificates 
(Netherlands, Sweden, and proposed for Norway) are rarely motivated without referring at least to the 
two first of these objectives.  
 
19 Exceptions from this rule are starting to influence the scientific literature, see for instance Berntsen et 
al. 2004.  
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domestically. This is exemplified by German policies which represent a web of national and 
local policy initiatives, where the latter aim to have green electricity in many locations of 
Germany. A different interpretation could be to increase the share of renewable energy 
sources in electricity consumption. This interpretation assumes that the objective includes 
green electricity produced abroad. This could be either through regular import of electricity or 
through import of green certificates (see next section) so that foreign electricity production 
effectively is subsidized by domestic consumers. We shall therefore broadly allow for both 
interpretations.  
3.2 Categorization of Policies and Policy Instruments 
In broad terms, a policy intervention to increase the share of green electricity will tax non-
green electricity and/or subsidizes green electricity. In Figure 3.1, a tax, t, shifts the marginal 
cost for non-green (MCN) upwards, and a subsidy to green, s, shifts the marginal cost (MCG) 
curve downwards. The intersection between the new dotted curves illustrates a share for green 
of 3 percent, which is about the average (categorizing hydro as non-green) in the case-study 
countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and USA, see table 2.3). When we exclude 
hydropower from the green category, cost considerations alone would have been responsible 
for keeping the share of green electricity to a minimum (less than 1 per cent) in most 
countries, were it not for policy interventions such as illustrated here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Share of green electricity supported by subsidy, and tax on non-green.20 
                                                     
20 The horizontal axis represents total production of electricity (and consumption, if we assume a closed 
economy). From left to right, MCN represents the marginal cost curve, or the supply curve for non-
green electricity. From right to left, MCG represents the supply curve for green electricity. The 
country’s total energy consumption is produced most effectively where the two curves intersect, but in 
the figure this happens outside the graph, so the share of green electricity (excluding hydropower) 
without policy intervention is zero.  
Non-green electricity 
 
 Total electricity production 
Green 
3 percent 
$/kWh 
t s
MCNMCG
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Governments can apply a wide range of policies and policy instruments to promote green 
electricity.21 A rough distinction is made between ‘command and control’ regulatory 
instruments and market-based instruments, such as green electricity trading schemes. Van 
Dijk et al. 2003 have developed a typology of those policy instruments that directly support 
renewable energy development. A distinction is made between financial and non-financial 
measures, both of which can be used to stimulate research and development, investments, 
production and consumption of renewable energy. The various policy instruments are 
categorized in Table 3.2 and discussed briefly below (based on de Vries et al. 2003). 
  
Table 3.2 Categorization of Policy Instruments for Promotion of Renewable Energy 
Policy area Financial measures  Non-financial 
measures 
RD&D - Fixed government RD&D subsidy 
- Grant for demonstration, development, test facilities, 
etc. 
- Zero (or low) interest loans 
- Negotiated agreements 
between producers and 
government 
 
Investment - Fixed government investment subsidy 
- Bidding system on investment subsidy/grant, or on long 
term feed-in tariff 
- Subsidy on switching to renewable energy production 
or on the replacement of old renewable energy 
installations 
- Zero (or low) interest loans 
- Tax advantage for renewable energy investments 
- Tax advantage on (interest on) loans for renewable 
energy investments 
 
Production - Feed-in tariff at a fixed level set by authorities 
- Revenue side of green certificate scheme 
- Bidding system on feed-in tariffs necessary to operate 
on a profitable base 
- Tax advantage on the income generated by renewable 
energy 
- Quota obligation on 
production (example: 
green certificates) 
 
Consumption - Tax advantage on the consumption of renewable 
energy 
- Tax on fossil fuels 
- Quota obligation on 
consumption  
- Education and 
campaign 
Source: van Dijk et al. 2003 
 
Feed-in tariffs – a payment by the grid operator per kilowatt hour to the green electricity 
provider – are a commonly used policy instrument. The term is used both for a regulated 
minimum price per unit of green electricity and for a defined premium over market electricity 
prices. Regulatory measures are usually applied to impose an obligation on the general 
electricity utilities to pay the (independent) green power producer a price as specified by the 
                                                     
21 The terms “renewable energy” and “renewable electricity” are used. Renewable electricity policies 
are a subset of renewable energy policies, which also include other forms of energy generated from 
renewable sources such as heat and gas. Many government policies, such as R&D subsidies, have a 
broad scope and target several types of renewable energy. Other policies, such as quota obligations on 
electricity production are restricted to renewable electricity only.  
CICERO Report 2005:03  
Green Electricity Market Development 
 
 
 
 
21
government. The tariff may be supplemented with subsidies from the state. The level of the 
tariff is commonly set for a number of years to give investors security on income for a 
substantial part of the project lifetime. Many different adaptations of the instrument are 
applied.  
Green certificates in effect combine command and control (certification, and the quota 
obligation) with financial incentives from certificate sales. Certificates are issued to 
distinguish electricity produced from certain renewable sources. The ‘green quality’ is 
incorporated in the green certificate, which is issued at the moment of production, and which 
can be traded separately from the sale of electricity. This way, a producer of electricity from 
renewable sources can have greater revenues, selling both certificates and power. Quota 
obligations are used to impose a minimum production or consumption of electricity from 
renewable energy sources, thereby creating a demand for the certificates. The government 
sets the framework within which the market has to produce, sell, or distribute a certain 
amount of energy from renewable sources. The certificates provide an accounting system to 
register production, authenticate the source of electricity, and to verify whether demand has 
been met. Penalties that are applied if the demand obligation is not met will also serve as a 
‘safety valve’ or ‘maximum price’. In an alternative system, certificate demand is voluntary 
and based on the customer’s willingness to pay for green electricity. 
Subsidies can be to both investments and R&D. Investment subsidies can help overcome the 
barrier of a high initial investment cost. This type of subsidy is commonly used to stimulate 
investments in less economical renewable energy technologies. Investment subsidies are 
usually a given fraction, say 20-50 percent of eligible investment costs, but subsidized, low 
interest rate loans are also considered. Subsidies to R&D typically go through national 
research programs funded through the general government budget. 
 Fiscal measures can support green electricity. These schemes may take different forms, 
which range from rebates on general energy taxes or rebates from special emission motivated 
taxes, to proposals for lower value added tax (VAT) rates or tax exemption for green funds, to 
more generous depreciation schemes. 
Bidding systems can be used to select beneficiaries and determine the level of investment 
support or production subsidies (and through feed-in-tariffs). Potential investors or producers 
have to compete through a competitive bidding system. The criteria for the evaluation of the 
bids are set before each bidding round. The government may for instance decide on the 
desired level of electricity from a group of renewable sources, and then let potential producers 
bid on the premium over market tariffs they require to provide a certain quantity for a given 
number of years. The premium may then be paid the producer by the network operator (as 
with a feed-in tariff system), who is reimbursed. Financing may be through a 
nondiscriminatory levy on all electricity consumption. In each bidding round, the most cost-
effective offers will be selected. If desirable, the bidding may be differentiated in bands of 
different technologies and energy sources.  
Policy instruments can be evaluated based on the following set of criteria: effectiveness, 
cost-efficiency, market certainty, transparency, and transaction costs.  
To measure the effectiveness of policy instruments, policy objectives should be clearly 
defined. In most cases, renewable energy policies aim for an increased share of renewable 
electricity, and effectiveness then means ensuring that such a goal is met. In principle, but not 
always in practice, a quota system could be an effective instrument to ensure such an 
increased share. Due to the long time perspective required for electricity investments to be 
justified, a quota system with its uncertain premium need not be as effective a stimulus as is – 
for instance – a long-term guaranteed premium for green electricity. Instruments such as 
R&D subsidies, financial measures like zero- or low-interest loans, tax credits, or feed-in-
CICERO Report 2005:03  
Green Electricity Market Development 
 
 
 
 
22
tariffs all work at different margins and time horizons, but generally provide no guarantee for 
meeting a certain predefined market share.  
Cost-efficiency of a policy instrument can be defined as the increase in green electricity 
divided by the cost of the instrument. In practice it is often difficult to assess cost-efficiency, 
due to uncertainty both in the incremental cost and in the resulting increase in green 
electricity provided. The cost-efficiency of a policy instrument also depends on the 
perspective of the stakeholder (van Dijk et al 2003). Government regulation could be efficient 
compared to subsidies, depending on how budgetary consequences are valued. Both 
investment incentives and feed-in tariffs may be inefficient if they do not create competition 
and incentives to reduce costs.  Quota systems and bidding procedures are often regarded 
efficient as they use competitive forces to hold down costs.  
Market certainty is an important element in promoting investments in renewable energy. 
Policy instruments have varying impacts on the level of market certainty (van Dijk et al, 
2003). A primary requirement is of course that green producers must be guaranteed access to 
the grid for their output. Long-term fixed feed-in tariffs contribute significantly to market 
certainty as investor risks are minimized. A system with obligated quotas provides less 
market certainty, but price fluctuations and market dynamics can be partly influenced by the 
design of the regime. Financial support will generally reduce technical and market risks.  
Transparency of policy instruments relates to implementation and monitoring, and to the 
costs for stakeholders of preparing a deal (van Dijk et al, 2003). The transparency of a feed-in 
tariff system is often considered high, and this is also the intention with trade-based 
instruments, such as certificates based on quota obligations.22 Frequently, subsidies and fiscal 
measures are less transparent, which may lead to an increase in transaction costs, such as 
search, approval and monitoring costs.  
In Table 3.3, five frequently used policy instruments in the case-study countries are 
evaluated based on the selected criteria described above (for evaluation of the policies 
implemented in the case-study countries, see section 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Evaluation of Main Policy Instruments 
 RD&D 
subsidies 
Investment 
subsidies 
Feed-in 
tariffs 
Production 
quota23 
Tax credits 
Effectiveness No 
guarantee 
No guarantee No 
guarantee 
+? No 
guarantee 
Cost-efficiency - - -/+ + -/+ 
Contribution to 
market certainty 
-/+ -/+ + -/+ -/+ 
Transparency and 
transaction costs 
- - + + - 
 
There are important and intricate questions about exactly how policy instruments work, 
whether they be green certificates (with obligated shares of green in consumption or 
production) or feed-in tariffs. Figure 3.2 illustrates the main logic behind any instrument 
driven by quota obligations, such as green certificate systems. The assumption is that there is 
cheap non-green electricity available (at a constant marginal cost, for simplicity, MCN), and 
                                                     
22 There can be problems with the certificate trading system, with high requirements in terms of 
monitoring and verification (see Sweden, section 3.3). 
23 Quotas are often associated with effectiveness (assurance of meeting objectives), but non-compliance 
can happen, and likely would in Norway in a dry year.  
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there is costlier green electricity available at constant MCG. The government forces producers 
(or vendors, or consumers) to blend the two rather than to simply use the lower cost 
alternative first, yielding a ‘blended’ marginal cost curve, MCGC. Each non-green producer 
could, then, make sure to build a kilowatt hour (kWh) of green for each they build of non-
green. But they can also buy certificates from green power producers. Green producers then 
get a ‘subsidy’ for their power production from the sale of certificates, so the MCGC curve 
gives a constant price blending of power stations at one price that equals MCG reduced by the 
subsidy and MCN raised by the cost of certificate purchases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Supply curves of non-green and green electricity24 
 
But it is important to acknowledge that there are alternative possible outcomes. One 
scenario to be aware of (see Bye et al. 2002a) is when the cost of green certificates gives no 
relevant increase to the marginal cost of non-green power, as will be the case in a market 
where most of the long-term costs are sunk costs (e.g. in hydropower markets). The market 
tariff may be dominated by a capacity constraint. In such a market, green certificates will not 
be able to force a substitution of green power for non-green power, so the market can only 
sell the green power by increasing the total amount of power produced, and the market price 
will for this reason be reduced as non-green producers accept the costs of the obligation.  
The distinction between long-term and short-term marginal cost is an important one in 
power markets, not the least for nuclear and hydro, and it does create complications in how 
green certificates markets function. Briefly put, in a closed market, if an obligated share of 
green power is higher than the available capacity in a given year, a high certificate price 
would not help meet the obligation unless the total demand were dramatically suppressed. 
Then, most likely, a fee paid by those in violation of the obligated share will clear the market, 
and the market will work, but fail to ‘meet the target’. Similarly, if the green capacity 
available is higher than the obligated share, the certificate price could be zero for that year, 
                                                     
24 The horizontal segments MCN and MCG, are the supply curves for non-green and green electricity, 
respectively. MCGC is a supply curve blending the two, using obligated shares of green electricity and 
green certificates bring green production on stream even though it would be out of the market without 
intervention. This is the intended mechanism of green certificates, and consumption is both greener and 
lower than it would have been without intervention. The intervention can be represented as equivalent 
to taxes and subsidies, shown in Figure 3.1.  
kWh
$/kWh 
MCN 
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and green producers would experience losses, though possibly produce.25 These 
complications can be reduced in large and open markets with jurisdictional borders (see the 
U.S. and Dutch case studies) or with long-term arbitration possibilities (a non-green producer 
may purchase certificates now which will put green capacity on the market in two years’ 
time).  
Nevertheless, these rigidities and complications are amongst the distinguishing features that 
can make other instruments more attractive. Others are the operation of registries to monitor 
certificate holders and trades, their compliance, and so on (see discussion in proposed law). 
The so-called feed-in tariffs, for instance can be used in more flexible ways. One is to 
subsidize long-term green power delivery by providing a contract upon construction, a model 
by which many problems are avoided.  
3.3 Institutional Dynamics of Green Electricity Markets 
This section addresses institutional aspects of policy development, focusing on the roles of 
various actors in the processes of designing, implementing and evaluating renewable 
electricity policies. The roles, positions and influence of key actors are discussed accordingly, 
emphasizing the German and Dutch cases for illustration. Different actors play different roles 
in the development of green electricity policies, with an important distinction between 
government actors and non-government stakeholders (see Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.4 Categorization of government and non-government actors 
Government Actors Non-government Actors 
Federal/national/state government, including: 
Ministry of Energy (or other ministry responsible for 
the energy sector) 
Ministry of the Environment 
Ministry of Finance 
Parliament 
Implementing agencies  
Inter-government bodies, e.g. EU 
Fossil fuel based power industry 
Energy industry associations 
Green industry (wind, solar, biomass, etc) 
Grey industry (steel, chemicals, cement, etc) 
Environmental NGOs 
Consumers 
Consumer associations 
Media groups 
 
3.3.1 Roles and Positions of Policymakers 
The main questions to be addressed are, who determines policy agenda? Who is directly or 
indirectly involved in policy-making? Who makes the final decisions on key policies? We 
first look at Germany and then the Netherlands. Germany has achieved the most success, 
compared with other EU member states, in establishing a domestic green electricity 
production capacity. The Netherlands has undergone a series of major policy shifts and has a 
strong domestic demand for green power, but has weak domestic production capacity.  
In Germany, a broad coalition and a strongly involved parliament have been the key 
pushers behind renewable energy policy development. The feed-in law of 1991 (StrEG) was 
initially designed by a coalition of conservatives, greens and a few social democrats, and was 
further developed under a red-green government. Only the Liberal Party did not actively 
promote this policy, but eventually voted in favor of the law. The political process that 
                                                     
25 Some of these difficulties are observed in the emerging Swedish green certificates market (see 
section 3.4.3).  
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resulted in the adoption of the Renewable Energy Law (EEG) in 2000 differed somewhat. As 
with the feed-in law in 1991, a parliamentary initiative acted as key catalyst. The EEG was 
partly driven by the coalition agreement of 1998, expressing the need for sustainable energy 
supply and reduction of CO2 emissions. The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA) took 
responsibility for reforming the renewable energy policy. Members of the parliament from the 
two coalition parties soon criticized the Ministry for not being progressive enough and finally 
brought their own proposal for the law.  
The all-party consensus leading to the adoption of EEG was new. The competition 
authority of the European Union was also involved in the policy process in 2000. The 
authority argued that the anticipated feed-in tariffs would distort market competition as the 
tariffs would excessively subsidize specific industries. This case was finally rejected by the 
European Court of Justice. The trend from all-party consensus towards a more polarized 
policy style has been accentuated under the drafting legislation for the EEG amendment of 
2004. Support for the draft law mainly came from members of the coalitions, with MEA again 
in a rather conservative position. But with responsibility for renewable energy transferred to 
the Ministry of Environment, the MEA position had less impact on the process. The main 
opposition came from conservative and liberal parties, but had little impact since it was not 
appreciated by the general public.  
In contrast to the German case dominated by a broad coalition, the Dutch study shows that 
a single actor can dominate the policy scene for a long time. The Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, responsible for renewable energy policy, has played a key role in the design and 
implementation of all renewable energy policies. The Ministry always advocated the 
importance of a voluntary market. Though this has not yet proven effective, the voluntary 
approach is in line with the traditional liberal markets perspectives in the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. Mandatory obligations would not easily fit in the tradition of the 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’ between government and industry, an approach which has long 
been advocated by the MEA. Renewable energy policy has also been influenced by another 
objective important to the Ministry, namely to avoid environmental legislation that might 
harm international competitiveness. Policy choices might have been different if energy had 
been the responsibility of another ministry, or if other stakeholders had played a stronger role. 
It is remarkable that other governmental actors, especially the Ministry of Environment, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Parliament, were unable to speed up the slow development of 
renewable energy, or to slow the mass outflow of government subsidies to other countries. On 
several occasions, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has overruled initiatives of other 
government departments and ignored advice both from parliamentary and special advisory 
bodies.  
3.3.2 Position and Influence of Non-government Stakeholders 
In Germany, both industry and the general public have directly or indirectly influenced policy 
decisions. From the beginning of the 1990s, the German Association of Small Hydro 
Generators played an important role in obtaining support from parliament, influencing the 
development of the feed-in law of 1991. In the end, however, wind energy became the main 
beneficiary of the law, and the electric utilities, including large utilities and the German 
Association of Electric Utilities, opposed it. The new law would replace a voluntary 
agreement with the utilities and would most likely reduce their influence. The sector argued 
that supporting small hydropower plants would be very costly. Ten years later, during the 
adoption of the renewable energy law (EEG), the lobby of electric utilities and industrial 
associations was much stronger. On the other hand, the lobby groups were more 
heterogeneous, as some members of industrial associations, such as wind manufacturers, 
benefited from the 1991 law. In general, industries are concerned about all support for 
renewable energy, as it is financed by all electricity consumers, and an extra burden for large 
industrial consumers was expected.  
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In Germany, the general public is very much in favor of renewable energy. The ‘green’ 
attitude is reflected in the relatively large support to the Green Party, and new laws have had 
even broader public support. In 2004, during the development of the EEG amendment, 
renewable energy manufacturers and their associations had become a relevant lobby group. 
The farmers’ association became a new supporter for renewable energy policy due to the 
opportunities for its members in both biomass and wind energy. The electric utilities were 
again among the opponents of the EEG amendment, but their criticism had shifted to 
disagreement on details. This mild opposition might have been caused by the fact that utilities 
have seen that increasing customer prices doesn’t automatically lead to commercial 
disadvantages. Some utilities had started to develop renewable energy projects and were 
potential beneficiaries of renewable energy support. The coal lobby, including the trade union 
of miners and the chemical industry, remained strong opponents.  
In the Netherlands, non-governmental stakeholders have played a modest role in the design 
of renewable energy policies. An exception is the grey industry, mostly energy intensive 
industries and the energy sector companies. These have lobbied to oppose both energy taxes 
and obligated shares of renewable electricity. Different stakeholders, especially NGOs, 
energy distribution companies and the media have played a role in raising consumer 
awareness in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2002. NGOs in cooperation with energy 
distribution companies set up many information campaigns on renewable electricity. As a 
result, many consumers switched to renewable electricity. This shift was facilitated when the 
price difference between grey and green electricity disappeared as the result of the ecotax. 
Anticipating future electricity market liberalization, electricity companies have used green 
electricity to attract and retain customers. 
3.3.3 Institutions and Actors in a Comparative Perspective  
The German and Dutch studies show that institutional settings in policy development can 
differ significantly. In the Netherlands, a single player dominated the policy scene for a long 
period, while in Germany a broad number of stakeholders have been involved. These 
differences are due to culture, tradition, and the political environment.  
The German case indicates that renewable energy policies can benefit from a broader 
support and early involvement of key stakeholders. Compared to Germany, Dutch policies 
have been developed and implemented by a small number of actors while input from others 
was limited. It is notable that renewable energy policies can benefit from strong and 
knowledgeable parliamentary participation, as the German Parliament gave an enormous 
stimulus to renewable energy policy development. Members of the Parliament have been well 
acquainted with the subject and have taken many initiatives over the last decade. The Dutch 
Parliament played a much weaker role, as it was seldom alert and did not initiate many new 
actions. The members of the Dutch parliament also failed in monitoring implementation, as 
illustrated by the fact that targets were never realized.  
A pro-green attitude facilitates policy adoption. The environmental awareness in Germany 
is relatively high, which is reflected in the strong Green Party. The situation is different in the 
Netherlands. The country has many green electricity customers, but they became aware and 
supportive only after policies were implemented. The lobbying power industry can be very 
effective. In both countries, large industries were exempted from renewable electricity 
regulation after successful lobby activities. Politicians are frequently sensitive to arguments 
about international competitiveness. In Germany, a concern to help build the green electricity 
industry has caught on, but this seems not to be the case in the Netherlands so far.   
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3.4 Policies and Policy Instruments in the Case-Study Countries 
This section presents a brief overview of the current and past policies and policy instruments 
applied in the case-study countries. It compares the policy instruments used in the four 
countries, and evaluates the policy effects. 
3.4.1 Germany 
The discussion on sustainable energy started in the early seventies, directly after the oil crisis 
in 1973. Although the debate primarily focused on the drawbacks of nuclear energy and the 
benefits of energy efficiency, renewable energy gained more and more attention over the 
years. The first energy research program was launched in 1974. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear 
accident was another important trigger for seeking new ways to generate power. More recent 
factors are the Rio conference in 1992 with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), followed by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Germany intends to 
become the world’s leading country on renewable energy, as seen from the Bonn Conference 
in 2004. 
The developments in public opinion were accompanied by technological change and the 
emergence of a renewable energy industry (mainly wind turbine technology). The 
development of wind turbines had two very different roots. First, there was an unsuccessful 
top-down approach by the government, where players in research and industry aim to  build a 
very large wind turbine from scratch. Second, several smaller players started building smaller 
turbines in a bottom-up approach, then gradually increasing size and finally becoming 
commercial success.  After years of support for technology development, the 1991 
introduction of the Feed-in Law (StrEG) gave fixed tariffs for renewable electricity. This 
marked a shift from R&D funding to production incentives. The system guaranteed long-term 
fixed prices with a purchase obligation, thus minimizing commercial risks for investors and 
project developers. This resulted in a significant growth of new capacity, especially wind 
energy. To stimulate electricity generation from biomass, a separate law providing resources 
for biomass was introduced in 2001. This resulted in fast biomass CHP development. The key 
elements of renewable energy policy are the system of feed-in tariffs introduced in 1991, 
updated with the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) in 2000 and the EEG amendment in 2004.   
Table 3.5 Milestones in Green Electricity Policy and Market in Germany 
1974 Start of R&D programs 
1970s – 1980s Technological support (esp. wind technology) 
Industrial development (esp. wind sector) 
1980s – 1990s Changing public opinion in favor of renewables and against nuclear 
1991 
2000 
2001 
2004 
Feed-in Law (StrEG) 
Renewable Energy Act (EEG) (update of StrEG) 
Biomass Law (closely linked to EEG) 
EEG mandate  
 
The German renewable energy policy has delivered results. Between 1990 and 2002, 
13,000 MW in new capacity came on stream. Germany has seen much stronger growth in 
renewables compared to EU average. Between 1991 and 2000, power generation from 
renewables grew by 142 percent, while over the same period other EU member countries 
experienced a growth of 25 percent. In the 1990s, the share of renewables almost doubled in 
Germany. In the EU as a whole, the share of renewables grew only by 13 percent. In addition, 
the costs of wind and solar power decreased by about 30 percent and 60 percent between 
1990 and 2000. 
CICERO Report 2005:03  
Green Electricity Market Development 
 
 
 
 
28
The objective of the German renewable energy policy has, however, not always been 
clearly defined. Although not explicitly stated, the StrEG of 1991 aimed at promoting 
renewable energy technologies. The EEG of 2000 stated that the purpose of the law was to 
facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply in the interest of managing global 
warming and protecting the environment. To achieve this, the law aimed at achieving a 
substantial increase in the percentage of electricity supplied by renewables, at least doubling 
the share of renewable energy sources by 2010. The EEG also made explicit reference to 
corresponding EU objectives. The EEG Amendment of 2004 is even more explicit. While 
retaining the EEG objective of sustainable energy supply to protect the climate and the 
environment, the new law – according to the draft adopted by the government in December 
2003 – also aims to 
• Reduce the cost of energy to the national economy by internalizing external cost; 
• Contribute to avoiding conflicts about allocation of fossil energy resources; 
• Promote development of renewable energy technologies; 
• Increase the share of renewable electricity supply to 12.5 percent by 2010 and 20 
percent by 2020. 
The feed-in tariff system provides no guarantee for achieving the policy objectives. The 
sharp increase in the share of renewables and the significant reduction of costs, however, lead 
to the conclusion that the policy instruments have been effective in the pursuit of these goals. 
In addition to increasing the share of renewables and reducing their costs, the policy also 
aimed to internalize the external costs. This objective has not been reached so far. Although 
no explicit targets for different technologies were set, the growth of other sources, especially 
biomass lagged behind.26  In addition to the feed-in tariffs, a large number of dispersed 
federal, regional and local support programs were available to support investment in 
renewable energy generation by subsidies, tax incentives or soft loans. The stop-and-go 
element in these support schemes, in addition to the fragmentation, has reduced their 
combined effect.  
3.4.2 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands has gained considerable experience in the promotion of the green energy 
market. Over the last three decades, a variety of policy instruments have been applied, 
including direct investment subsidies, fiscal support, voluntary agreements, consumer 
subsidies and R&D programs. 
Directly after the first oil crisis of the 1970s, the government started promoting R&D for 
renewable energy. In this period, industrial activities were set up to use wind and solar 
energy. These were often driven by personal idealism rather than long-term corporate 
strategy. In the 1980s, policies shifted to direct investment subsidies and financing for 
demonstration projects. The intention was to speed up market growth to facilitate cost 
reduction and further market expansion. In the early 1990s, international agreements on GHG 
mitigation gave renewable energy a new momentum.  
In the early 1990s, the government negotiated voluntary agreements with the energy 
distribution sector. The latter committed to voluntary sales targets for renewables amounting 
to 3.2 percent of electricity sales and 0.7 percent of gas sales by the year 2000. These 
measures were expected to lead to a 2.7 Mt reduction in CO2 emissions over the same period. 
Investments in green energy were financed by a general environmental levy. In 1996, the 
government introduced a regular energy tax (the “ecotax”) for small- and medium-scale 
                                                     
26 Recent developments in Germany indicate that industries invest heavily in biomass combined 
heat/power applications which have been driven by government policies and support programs.    
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energy users. This new tax system was made to stimulate green electricity consumption by 
exempting green electricity. In addition, production support was given to green suppliers. In 
2002, total support to green electricity amounted to eight Euro Cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) 
(six Euro Cents for consumer support and two Euro Cents for production support). In terms of 
cost, support for renewables amounted to €150 per ton of CO2 (van Rooijen and van Wees 
2004). 
An informal, voluntary green label system was implemented by the energy sector in 1998. 
The green label system set a target for green electricity in the Netherlands, which was further 
specified for each of the participating companies. The green electricity price under the label 
system consisted of three components: i) a small feed-in price based on an agreement between 
Dutch distributors and renewable generators (later replaced by a pool price/guaranteed price), 
ii) the green label price (average of 2 Euro cents/kWh), and iii) a production subsidy. With 
the liberalization of the electricity market in 2001, a new mechanism for the voluntary trade 
of green certificates became operational, replacing the green label system. The goal was to 
stimulate the domestic production of green electricity. The green certificate system was linked 
to the energy tax exemption scheme and production subsidies (Dinica and Arentsen 2004). 
During 2001, imported green electricity was not eligible for the eco-tax exemption, but 
distribution companies lobbied for including imports. The argument was that domestic 
production capacity was insufficient to meet demand. As of January 2002, imports also 
became eligible (van Damme and Zwart 2003).  
In July 2003, a new policy titled “environmental quality of electricity production” (MEP) 
was introduced. Two main objectives of the MEP were to reduce investment risks and to 
improve the cost-effectiveness of renewable electricity. Support is provided by means of a 
feed-in tariff combined with a partial exemption from the ecotax. The tariff is financed 
through an annual levy on household electricity connections. The ecotax exemption will be 
phased out. Thus, by 2005, the promotion of the Dutch green electricity market will be fully 
supply driven. Table 3.6 shows the milestones for the Dutch policy approach.  
Table 3.6 Milestones in Green Electricity Policy and Market in the Netherlands 
1970s  RD&D policies, industrial development, especially wind and solar 
1980s Investor subsidies and demonstration projects 
early 1990s New momentum: CO2 targets 
early 1990s Voluntary agreements between the government and energy distribution sector 
1996 Regulatory energy tax (consumption stimulation) 
1998 Introduction of voluntary green label system 
2001 Liberalization of the energy market and introduction of green certificate system 
2003 Introduction of environmental quality of electricity production (MEP), focusing on 
production stimulation 
 
The voluntary agreement of the early 1990s can be seen as an important milestone, as it 
was the first time that the government intervened to set targets. The targets were, however, 
never met because the goals were not compulsory and the compliance regime was poor.  
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the second phase (1996–2002) is difficult because 
policy objectives were not clearly stated. Since the mid-1990s, renewable energy policy 
matured, and more stakeholders became involved in the process. The government, however, 
did not choose between stimulating demand or supply. This resulted in a strange outcome 
where targets were mainly supply-driven (i.e. stimulate investments in renewable energy) 
while instruments primarily focused on promoting demand. The results were poor, as the 
steep increase in demand for renewable electricity could not be met by national production, 
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and imports of green electricity increased rapidly. Criticism grew as Dutch taxpayers’ money 
was spent on green electricity generated in other countries, generation that was not additional 
from the perspective of the Netherlands. 
The green label system was unfortunately timed and only operational for two years. It was 
introduced towards the end of the voluntary environmental program of Dutch distributors, a 
commitment made under the old monopolistic regulatory scheme. A new electricity law 
promoted in 1998 launched a new regulatory context better matched to the gradually 
liberalizing electricity market. Contrary to the green label system, the tradable green 
certificate system introduced in 2001 has no specified supply/purchase obligation. Combined 
with a demand strongly dependent on the exemption from the eco-tax, this led to a highly 
uncertain market environment for potential investors (Dinica and Arentsen 2004). 
Although the policy was quite effective in reducing administrative barriers, it is 
questionable whether the right barriers had been addressed. Only at a late stage did the 
government see the problem of an unstable investment climate, and did not succeed in 
creating a stable investment climate. Policies were diverse and complex and changed over 
time, as with subsidy conditions, eligibility of technologies for support, and the level of 
support. According to Dinica (2002), the Dutch government did not succeed in building 
investor confidence through stable policies, and failed to reduce market uncertainties. The 
lack of clear and consistent policy objectives, instruments, and enforcement procedures has 
hindered substantial investments. The notion of the unstable investment climate as a potential 
barrier was adopted late. 
Although the effectiveness of Dutch green electricity policy between 1996 and 2002 has 
been limited, government strategy has had some positive effects. First, consumer awareness 
has increased, and renewable energy use has become part of the lifestyle of many households. 
Second, the liberalization of the green electricity market has paved the way for the broader 
liberalization of the energy market. The energy sector grew accustomed to the new market 
conditions and became used to launching marketing campaigns to attract new customers. 
Finally, the Netherlands has gotten attention as a front-runner in promoting consumer 
participation in green electricity campaigns.  
The Netherlands is so far the only EU country that combines feed-in tariffs with a green 
certificate scheme. It has been hoped that the feed-in tariff would help secure substantive 
market certainty to investors. At this early stage of development, however, it is a bit early to 
evaluate the effects of this policy instrument. 
3.4.3 Sweden 
Renewable energy development in Sweden is very much related to nuclear power, which has 
been debated for decades. Political decisions have been made to decommission the nuclear 
power plants. The concern about the negative impacts on industrial competitiveness, however, 
has hindered firm actions so far. To date there is still a lack of national consensus on the 
approach and timeframe for phasing out of nuclear power. The result is a rather weak 
government commitment towards renewable energy, which is reflected in the short-term 
nature of the subsidy programs for the renewable energy sources. In addition, CO2 policies 
have not given additional incentives for renewables, as the energy sector is already almost 
carbon free.  
Since 1991, policies have been adopted to promote renewable energy. These measures 
include investment subsidies, tax relief for renewable energy and emission taxes. The taxation 
of fossil fuels has been gradually increased since its introduction in the early nineties. The 
carbon tax is, however, levied only on fossil fuels used in heating sectors, while power 
generation is exempted. Since 1994, small-scale electricity production based on renewable 
energy sources is (partly) exempted from the energy tax. This provides a tax benefit of 1–
2 ct/kWh. Since the seventies, the government also promoted renewable energy by means of 
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supporting research programs and technology demonstration. The 1997 Energy Act confirmed 
the energy policy guidelines of 1991, and formed the basis of the new energy policy program 
that became operational in 1998. The program had two main components: a seven-year 
extension of the energy research program and a five-year program of subsidies until the end 
of 2002. 
Approved by the Swedish Parliament in 2002, the green certificates scheme27 
(‘Elcertifikat’) came into force on May 1, 2003. The target is to increase the production of 
renewable electricity by 10 TWh from the 2002 level by the year 2010. A quota obligation is 
formally imposed on electricity users, increasing from 7.4 percent in 2003 to 16.9 percent in 
2010.28 The consumers can either let the electricity suppliers ensure that the consumers’ quota 
obligation is met or, from 2004, voluntarily handle the quota obligation on their own. For the 
first five years a price guarantee will be offered to electricity generators to secure their market 
for certificates. The price guarantee decreases from SEK 60 per certificate in 2003 to SEK 20 
per certificate in 2007. Several transition schemes for the period up to 2009 have been made 
so that the market actors will have some time to adjust to the new system. Only production 
that takes place within Sweden is eligible for certificates. However, the long-term intention is 
to also include production from other countries and be compatible with envisaged EU 
initiatives.  
In 2004, the green certificate scheme was assessed by the Swedish Energy Agency (SEA) 
(SEA 2004a, 2004b). In its first year of operation, virtually no new production capacity was 
added but there was significant fuel switching from fossil fuels to biofuels in existing plants. 
The SEA Director General, Mr. Korsfeldt, stated that under the current condition, the target of 
an additional 10 TWh of renewable electricity by 2010 would not be achieved. The system 
does not constitute adequate support for technical development, and no major new 
investments were made as a result of the electricity certificate system in the first quota year. If 
the electricity certificate system is made permanent and the quota levels are made transparent 
for a period of 10–15 years, Mr. Korsfeldt finds it probable that the willingness to invest will 
be sufficient for the target. The SEA further stressed the importance of continued investments 
in research and technological development (SEA 2004c).  
The average price of a green certificate in 2004 has been around 3 øre/kWh29, a small 
increase from 2003. For a household using electricity for heating (20,000 kWh/year), the 
green certificates accounted for 2.4 percent (about 572 SEK) of the total cost of electricity. 
However, only 49 percent (or 650 million SEK) of what the consumers paid for the 
certificates in 2003 went to the producers of electricity from renewable energy sources. 
Seventeen percent went to cover the administrative costs and profits for the electricity 
suppliers. The government received 20 percent through value-added tax and another 14 
percent through fines (as not enough certificates were bought, see SEA 2004b). The twin 
observations that little new capacity has been added and that less than half of what consumers 
pay for the certificates went to renewable energy sources could undermine support for the 
system. The effectiveness of the green certificate scheme has also been criticized by 
concerned NGOs.30 
                                                     
27 Including power from wind, solar, biomass (including peat), geothermal energy, tidal power, wave 
energy and hydropower. All new hydropower plants and a limited number of old ones due to the size 
will be included. 
28 Even though the scheme formally includes all energy consumers, it should be noted that the el-
intensive industry does not have any required share.” 
29 1 øre = 1/100 krone 
30 The Swedish system for Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCS) is not working in the right way, 
according to Johan Kling, project coordinator of the Swedish label Bra Miljöval and working on the 
eco-labeling of transport systems for the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation. “The system is not 
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The subsidies provided in the 1990s have proven insufficient to bridge the gap in costs to 
alternatives of hydro and nuclear. After the liberalization of the electricity market in 1996, the 
gap became even bigger as prices went down. It is expected that the quota system will result 
in a higher share of biomass-based electricity production. Table 3.7 shows the major 
milestones in the Swedish policy approach.  
Table 3.7 Milestones in Green Electricity Policy and Market in Sweden 
1975 First energy research program (including renewables) 
1991 Energy policy guidelines adopted by the parliament (introduction of direct investment 
subsidies for wind and biofuels and of environmental taxation) 
1996 Liberalization of the energy market 
1997 Energy act (extension of research program and subsidy measures) 
2002 Approval of the green certificate scheme by parliament 
Elimination of investment subsidies 
2003 Introduction of the green certificate system (based on obligated quotas) 
 
For a long time, the Swedish renewable energy policy mainly consisted of supportive R&D 
programs and investment subsidies. Despite these policies, studies show that the Swedish 
efforts have had modest results. According to Åstrand and Neij (2004), the level of installed 
capacity per euro spent on market subsidies and R&D for wind energy is 2 to 5 times lower 
compared to Germany and Spain. The most recent evaluation also concludes that there has 
been too much faith in the possibilities of energy RD&D as a stimulus for the transition of the 
energy system (Arnold and Chesshire 2003). 
Low performance could also be caused by a lack of continuity and coherence in the 
government policies on renewable energy. Subsidy schemes have lacked continuity; there 
were even intervals without any subsidies at all. Also, the long-term government intentions 
have not been clear. The lack of continuity and long-term commitment is mainly driven by 
the position of nuclear energy. During the last two decades, the deadlock on nuclear power 
issues has made it difficult for the government to have a consistent policy to promote 
renewables. The Swedish situation illustrates the importance of consensus on long-term 
objectives and strategy.  
The lack of coordination between different parts of the government has also hindered the 
development of wind energy. As government commitment to promote wind power has not 
                                                                                                                                                        
efficient in stimulating investments in new production of renewable power”, he says. Since May 2003 
Sweden has a national obligation for renewables, imposed on all consumers. In practice, the obligation 
(a share of 7.4 percent in 2004, rising to 16.9 percent in 2010) is transferred to suppliers, who get paid 
extra money in meeting the obligation on behalf of their customers. “In the first year of the ROCS 
system only 40 million of the 130 million Euros paid extra by customers was invested in renewables”, 
according to Kling. “The rest was spent on taxes, VAT, fines and administration costs. In the first year 
of ROCS almost half of all suppliers chose not to invest in renewable sources, but to pay fines for not 
meeting the obligation. Therefore the ROCS system is rather a masked tax system than a system for 
certifying the quality of electricity.” At present Kling is discussing the certificates system with the 
Swedish Energy Agency and the government. “In the long run the obligation could lead to rising green 
energy production, but at present this is not the case. The criteria are very flexible.” In Kling’s opinion 
the system is also unsuitable to meet the European Directive on disclosure of information about the fuel 
mix of each supplier (mandatory as from July 1st 2005). “Full disclosure could be built on the ROCS, 
but for now there is not enough control. At present, it is possible to use the power coming from one 
wind power plant for both the renewable obligation and for export, thus double counting the economic 
value of wind power.” (Source: Green Prices, Nov.30, 2004)  
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had enough strength, the reaction of the regional and local governments, which are in charge 
of issuing the permits, is slow.  
3.4.4 The United States 
In the United States, governments and regulatory agencies at the federal, state, and local 
levels have adopted specific policies to support wind, solar, biomass, and other renewable 
energy sources. Deregulation, for example on the opening up of markets, has facilitated 
power generation from renewable sources. Deregulation in the United States started in late 
1970s. At the federal level, the government has provided R&D funding, demonstration grants, 
and other financial incentives, including tax deductions and credits for electricity produced 
from wind, solar, geothermal and closed-loop biomass facilities. The federal renewable 
energy production incentive (also called the production tax credit), first enacted in 1992 as 
part of the Energy Policy Act, provides financial incentives for electricity produced from new, 
qualifying renewable energy facilities. The federal production tax credit has played an 
important role in the recent wind energy development. The federal government also allows 
accelerated depreciation for corporate investments in solar, geothermal, and wind facilities. 
The federal Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 has also played an 
important role in renewable energy development by requiring utilities to purchase electricity 
from small-scale production facilities.  
At the state level, there is considerable variation both in the general regulatory environment 
and green electricity policies. Most states apply a wide range of financial incentives to 
promote renewable energy, including production incentives, personal and corporate tax 
credits, grants and loans or leasing programs. Also various rules and regulations vary, with 
examples including construction and design standards as well as green power purchasing 
requirements. In 2003, 15 states have adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which 
require a gradually increasing percentage of an electricity provider’s electricity sales to come 
from qualifying renewable energy sources. Some states allow retail electricity providers to 
use tradable renewable energy credits to satisfy the RPS requirement. Recently, a number of 
voluntary measures, such as educational and outreach programs, has been adopted. Most 
measures are still in the process of implementation. Table 3.8 shows the major milestones in 
the US policy approach. 
Table 3.8 Milestones in Green Electricity Policy and Market in the USA 
1978 Start with restructuring of the electricity market (PURPA) 
1992 Federal renewable energy production incentive (production tax credit) as part of 
the Energy Policy Act 
90’s-ongoing Wide range of financial incentives, rules and regulation and voluntary measures 
applied by state or local governments 
2003-ongoing Adoption of RPS (state level) 
 
While there has been interest in promoting the use of renewable energy in electricity 
production for a number of years in the United States, the market share of non-hydro 
renewable energy sources in electricity production has remained at about 2 percent over the 
past decade. An evaluation of policy instruments is difficult, because most measures are still 
in the early stage of implementation. Reliable data on program funding, cost, and energy 
savings from different types of policy measures are not yet available. In addition, the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy instruments is difficult because objectives 
haven’t always been clearly defined. The RPS of 2003 is the only instrument establishing 
specific targets for renewable electricity.  
Of the instruments most widely applied, financial incentives used in conjunction with 
mandatory regulations such as net-metering and RPS appear to have been the most effective 
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in promoting renewable energy technologies. Public benefits funds (supported by surcharges 
on electricity users) have also played a role in stimulating renewable energy technologies and 
in promoting green electricity products. Competition at the retail level in restructured markets 
and green-pricing programs offered by traditional utilities have also helped to develop green 
energy sources. In conjunction with green power education programs, these instruments may 
be critical for long-term development of the green electricity industry. 
Despite all efforts, important impediments to green electricity remain. Barriers still not 
effectively addressed include the relatively high cost of electricity from renewable energy 
sources, price distortions from external costs or direct subsidies, lack of customer awareness 
on green power products, and the abundance of coal and other conventional energy sources. 
In the absence of significant increases in fossil fuel prices, much more stringent 
environmental regulations, or significant changes in electricity customer preferences, green 
electricity markets are likely to continue to develop slowly. 
3.5  Comparison of Policies and Policy Instruments 
The policies and policy instruments of the four countries show similarities as well as 
differences. In most countries, the initial debates on renewable energy started after the first oil 
crisis in 1973. Germany and the Netherlands immediately took action. In both countries, the 
1970s and 1980s are characterized by a focus on R&D programs and industrial development. 
The situation is slightly different for Sweden, as the oil crisis there resulted in a shift to 
nuclear power. At a later stage the envisaged phase-out of nuclear plants has contributed to 
renewable energy policies. The United States is in important ways behind the other countries 
in developing a clear national policy framework for renewables, and most of the policy 
implementation happens at the state and local levels (see Table 3.9).  
Table 3.9 Main Characteristics of the Policy Approach in the Case-Study Countries  
Germany: 
First discussions on renewables started directly after the first oil crisis in 1973 
Initial activities on research, technology and industry development (R&D incentives) 
Important milestone: Feed-in Law in 1991 (production incentives) 
Significant increase in new capacity and cost reduction since the beginning of the 1990s 
The Netherlands: 
Thirty years of experience with a wide mix of policy instruments 
Many fundamental shifts in policy direction 
Present key instrument: feed-in tariff (production incentive) + green certificates 
Sweden: 
Discussion on renewables not stimulated by oil crisis and CO2 targets but by the discussions on the 
phase out of nuclear power 
Late development of policy instruments compared to other countries 
Main policy instruments until 2003: investment subsidy and R&D  
Present policy: green certificate system base on quota obligation 
The United States: 
Wide mix of policy instruments applied at federal, state and local level 
Considerable variation among states 
Most instruments are in an early stage of implementation 
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In the 1990s, debates on renewable energy got an extra stimulus from international 
environmental actions, such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Recently, the Political 
Declaration and the International Action Program at the International Renewable Energy 
Conference in Bonn (2004) has indicated a new trend of development on renewable power 
generation, which has encountered wider support from different stakeholders around the 
world. 
Over the past few decades, all countries have employed a mix of policy instruments to 
support renewable energy. As indicated in Table 3.10, all countries have had one or more 
shifts in policy focus over the last three decades. Policies in general change from R&D 
support towards production incentives. Although R&D support is still present in all countries, 
it remained the key factor until recently only in Swedish RE policy. Most shifts in policy 
focus have occurred in the Netherlands. The 1970s focused primarily on R&D stimulus, 
followed by investment subsidies in the 1980s, consumer support in the 1990s, and producer 
support at present.  
Table 3.10 Primary Focus of Policy Instruments 
 Germany Netherlands Sweden United States 
RD&D 1970s–1980s 1970s 1970s–1990s  
Investments  1980s 1990s  
Production 1991–present 2003—present 2003–present 1992–present 
Consumption  1996–2002   
 
Table 3.11 shows that most case-study countries support renewable energy by financial 
incentives. The quota system in Sweden and the RPS of the United States are presently the 
only non-financial instruments applied. Despite longstanding experience with renewable 
energy policies in many countries, various policies are still in an early stage of 
implementation, with Germany’s Feed-in Law (1991) as a notable exception.  
Table 3.11 Financial and Non-financial Policies for Renewable Energy  
 Financial Non-financial 
R&D Germany (1970s–1980s) 
Netherlands (1970s) 
Sweden (1970s–1990s) 
The United States (late 1970s–present) 
 
Investment Netherlands (1980s) 
Sweden (1991–2002) 
 
Production Feed-in tariff Germany (1991–present) 
Feed-in tariff Netherlands (2003–present) 
Production Tax Credit US (1992–present) 
Tax (exemption) Sweden (1990s) 
Quota Sweden (2003–present) 
RPS US (2003–present) 
Consumption Ecotax Netherlands (1996–2002) Voluntary agreement  
Netherlands (early 1990s) 
  
It is clear that countries do not stimulate different renewable technologies neutrally. 
Germany and the Netherlands, for example, use differentiated feed-in tariffs for different 
technologies. The Swedish quota system, however, does not differentiate renewable energy 
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technologies. As the quota system sets targets for the share of renewables as a whole, it is 
likely that least-cost technologies will develop more quickly. 
4 Green Electricity Market Development in Norway 
The Norwegian energy sector is dominated by the high dependence on electricity 
consumption, as Norway has the highest per capita use of electricity in the world. This is 
partly explained by a high share of electricity-intensive industries in Norwegian 
manufacturing. However, even controlling for electricity use in manufacturing, Norway 
would rank high in terms of electricity use per capita (NVE 2000). Electricity has a high share 
in general energy use, including heating purposes. Hydropower completely dominates 
electricity production. Due to limited growth in production capacity and a slow and relatively 
constant growth in overall energy consumption, the nationwide energy balance has become 
increasingly dependent on imports. This chapter presents the energy sector31 in Norway in 
terms of energy use and energy resources, the electricity market, policies and policy 
instruments in use, potentials for green electricity and the main barriers to green energy 
market development.  
4.1 Energy Use and Resources 
4.1.1 Energy Use 
In the Norwegian energy system, electricity is mainly used for stationary energy 
consumption. Petroleum products are used in the transport sector, and coal, coke and gas are 
used as inputs for the industry.  
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Source: NVE 2003 
Figure 4.1. Energy Use by Energy Carriers (1970–2001)  
 
                                                     
31 The chapter will, as in the case-study countries, focus mainly on electricity. However as one of the 
main energy policy targets in Norway the latest years has been to reduce the dependence on electricity, 
the discussion will also reflect alternative ways to obtain a more sustainable energy system more 
broadly.  
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Figure 4.1 shows the total annual energy consumption by the various energy carriers. As 
seen from this overview, the use of electricity has increased significantly from 1970 to 2001. 
Although the oil crisis in 1973 and 1979 did reduce the consumption of petroleum products, 
the overall consumption has been relatively stable.32 The other carriers are relatively small in 
the overall energy mix, but bioenergy is becoming more important and the use of district 
heating33 is not widespread.  
Total stationary energy consumption has grown slowly the latest few years. The energy 
intensive industry and other parts of the private sector account for most of the increased 
energy use. The domestic housing sector has become highly dependent on electricity, as the 
use of oil has been drastically reduced since the 1980s. The use of fuel wood in the housing 
sector has increased somewhat since the mid 1990s.34 Figure 4.2 shows that the relative price 
of electricity is low in Norway compared to its Nordic neighbors. Compared with Norway, 
electricity is far more expensive than other heating resources in Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland. In Denmark, the price of electricity is prohibitively high for heating purposes. Thus 
almost every Danish consumer uses district heating or natural gas for heating. 
 
Source: Espegren 2004.  
Figure 4.2 Nordic Energy Prices Countries (2002) 
4.1.2 Energy Resources 
In 2003, Norway was the world’s seventh largest producer and the third largest exporter of 
oil.35 The amount of crude oil produced annually has been fairly stable since the mid-1990s 
                                                     
32 Note that this includes the energy use for transport, such as gasoline and diesel. 
33 District heating systems constitute a heating system transporting warm water (or steam) in pipes 
between buildings 
34 A difficult aspect considering domestic energy use is to quantify the amount of wood fuel used. It is 
estimated that as much as 70 percent of the fuel wood used is not traded commercially but cut by the 
end user, or traded privately without taxation.  
 
35 Including natural gas liquids (NGL) and condensates. 
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at approximately 150–160 million metric tons per year, of which about 130–140 million 
metric tons are exported. Natural gas production has increased significantly from about 42 
billion Sm3 in 1996 to about 75 billion Sm3 in 2003, almost all exported (Statistics Norway 
2004a). 
Norway is also rich in renewable energy resources. During the last century a substantial 
amount of hydropower has been developed, with a total production capacity (in an average 
year) of 118.4 TWh/year. This is on average about 99.6 percent of the gross national 
electricity production. Most of the installed capacity comes from hydropower stations of 
above 10 MW, while 4.4 TWh comes from stations between 1–10 MW and 0.25 TWh from 
installations less than 1 MW. Due to variations in precipitation, the amount of electricity 
produced from hydropower can vary from 89 TWh in a dry year to 150 TWh in a wet year. 
The technical and economic potential for large hydropower has been estimated at 186.5 
TWh/year, but of this 36.5 TWh is protected from development. Given current production 
capacity, the remaining technical and economical potential for large hydropower is about 30 
TW (OED 2004). However, based on the public opinion and the political environment, not 
much of this is likely to be developed.  Estimates show that there is a technical and 
economical potential for small hydropower of about 25 TWh/year (NVE 2004a).  
Despite moderate support there has been a great interest in developing wind energy in 
Norway since 1997. In 2003, 65 wind turbines were operating at 14 locations along the coast. 
The total installed capacity is 97 MW, with capacities for each of these turbines ranging from 
55 kW to 2 MW. The estimated annual production in 2003 was 219 GWh/year.36 Additional 
capacity is being installed at Hitra (70 MW) and Smøla (stage 2 = 105 MW). The Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) has received plans to build up to 2,900 MW 
of capacity, producing a total of 8.8 TWh/year. NVE (2001) has estimated the physical 
potential for wind power at 480 TWh/year,37 which is some four times the annual electricity 
produced from hydropower. 
Bioenergy as a source of heat has earned a more important position in energy supply due to 
higher electricity prices. Bioenergy heating (not electricity production) is a competitive 
energy source when bioenergy or waste is available at low cost and close to the end user, 
when the project building or process has a piped (warm water or steam) heating system, and 
when the energy consumption is relatively high. NVE (2001) estimates that bioenergy 
production could increase from the current 15 TWh/year to about 35 TWh/year. In addition to 
the use of biomass for heating purposes, there are possibilities for electricity production 
(cogeneration). This is relevant in the wood processing industry, in conjunction with waste 
treatment plants, and for use in district heating systems. There are some existing smaller 
bioenergy electricity plants that use landfill gas or waste combustion, as well as some sludge 
processing plants. The present electricity production from bioenergy is approximately 160 
GWh/year.  
The use of active solar energy systems is not very common in Norway. Demonstration 
facilities have been installed, mainly with positive experience. Passive use of solar energy is 
closely linked to the construction of home exteriors, and many houses utilize passive solar 
heating, but without any estimates of the energy used or saved. Typical features of passive 
(solar energy) houses are high insulation values on the entire building exterior, optimum 
orientation, and location in the landscape. The use of grid connected photovoltaic systems 
(PV) is rather limited in Norway. There are some demonstration sites showing various types 
of PV panels, as well as building integrated installations. In summer houses and cabins, off-
grid PV installations were common during the 1980s. NVE (2001) estimates that solar energy 
                                                     
36 Data for 2003 submitted to IEA. 
37 Assumes an average wind speed greater than 8 m/s at a height of 50 meters and with a wind turbine 
density of 15 MW/km2. 
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could account for an additional 20 TWh/year through the use of active and passive solar 
energy. 
A prototype tidal energy turbine of 300 kW made by Hammerfest Strøm AS was installed 
in Kvalsundet and connected to the grid in autumn 2003. There are also other on-going 
studies considering the use of tidal currents, especially in the counties of Troms and 
Finnmark. Studies are also undertaken on effects of the underwater turbines on sea life. The 
Norwegian government in the 1980s gave substantial financial support to the development of 
wave energy R&D. A range of demonstration installations was made. Recently, the state-
owned foundation Enova has granted NOK 30 million as subsidy to a sea-wave driven power 
plant in Rogaland and test production will begin in December 2005.38  
4.2  Electricity Sector Development  
In this section, we focus on Norwegian electricity production, the deregulation of the 
Norwegian electricity market, electricity prices and the electricity balance.  
4.2.1 Electricity Production  
Table 4.1 shows the dominance of hydropower in electricity production in Norway. From 
1991 to 2002, hydropower accounted on average for 99.6 percent of the total electricity 
production. Some electricity is produced in thermal power plants. Such power plants have a 
limited installed capacity and are often located close to and owned by industrial companies 
that use the heat and electricity themselves. The energy inputs are often fossil fuels and 
bioenergy (waste). This is a small but somewhat increasing niche. Although electricity 
production from wind is still small, there is an increasing development potential. 
Table 4.1 Electricity Production in Norway, 1991–2002 (GWh) 
Year Hydropower Wind 
power 
Thermal 
power 
Total Share of non-
hydro (percent) 
2002 129,837 75 561 130,473 0.49 
2000 142,289 31 496 142,817 0.37 
1995 122,487 10 514 123,011 0.43 
1991 110580 - 429 111,011 0.39 
Source: Statistics Norway 2004b   
 
The use of district heating in Norway must be seen in conjunction with electricity 
production. The use of district heating systems has gradually been developed since the early 
1980s. Spurred by higher electricity prices and some financial support, a range of district 
heating systems have been established. From 1994 to 2000, heat production increased from 
about 1.8 TWh to 2.2 TWh. Several of these systems include advanced multi-fuel burners, so 
fuels can be switched continuously. The most important heating sources are waste, electricity, 
petroleum products, and industrial waste heat (the renewable share of the waste heat is 
considered renewable energy). Market conditions and price fluctuations explain changes in 
the energy mix from one year to another. The challenge with respect to increasing the use of 
biomass in these systems is the cost of fuel, collection, handling and transportation (NVE 
2003). 
                                                     
38 The Norway Post, Dec.24, 2004. 
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4.2.2 Deregulation and Electricity Prices 
The Norwegian electricity market was deregulated in 1991 and is currently one of the most 
open in the world. The electricity market was formally opened for free competition in 1991, 
but real market access for all end-users was not established until 1995. All customers, 
including individual households, have access to competing suppliers. Border tariffs between 
Norway and Sweden have been abolished. Transmission tariffs are completely independent of 
trading agreements. The Nordic electricity exchange, Nord Pool, organizes an electricity spot-
market and a futures market where it is possible to trade weekly contracts up to three years 
ahead. Prices in all markets, including bilateral contracts and the retail market, relate to the 
spot-market. Also in short-term operation of the network, the system-operators are obliged to 
use market operations as far as possible. All providers are free to negotiate bilateral physical 
contracts, but trade in the futures market is increasing rapidly. In Norway, all long-term 
contracts are financial, with physical electricity being traded in the spot-market. 
Of the about 340 utility companies, there are many different types of energy utilities, and 
the extent of their involvement in electricity generation, trading and transmission varies 
widely. Important types include production companies, grid companies, vertically integrated 
utilities and industrial companies. Many energy utilities have in recent years been converted 
from municipally owned companies to limited share companies. As a consequence of the 
deregulation, utility companies were forced to deliver electricity at competitive prices. 
Increased competition has thus forced the utility companies to become more conscious of the 
cost of the energy development.  
Prior to the deregulation in 1991, the official Statkraft prices were decided annually by the 
Parliament to ensure stable and acceptably low energy prices. During the first few years after 
the deregulation, the production capacity was still high relative to the demand, and the lower 
energy prices reduced interest in energy savings for many users. It also resulted in worse 
conditions for renewables to compete price-wise with direct electrical heating. Consumption 
in all sectors has been constantly rising since 1991. Since 1996, average production capacity 
has been about equal to or less than total energy demand, resulting in higher prices and the 
need for import of electricity.  
Electricity spot prices have increased gradually, as seen by the higher prices in years 2001, 
2002 and 2003 (Figure 4.3). In October 2002 the price rose quite dramatically, due to a very 
dry period in the fall, and the price remained high until the melting of snow in the spring of 
2003. Even if Norway has transmission capacity to neighboring countries, the capacity is 
limited. The prices fluctuate, and deviate from those in neighboring countries mainly when 
peaks and troughs are encountered. Prices tend to be low throughout much of the year 
(summer and autumn) with occasional “spikes” in the autumn/winter, as in 2002/03.  
This illustration is relevant in Norwegian energy policy. It clearly illustrates the 
vulnerability of being dependent on a sole source of energy that is not fully controllable, such 
as hydropower. Since the deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market, the highly 
variable spot price has also represented the typical buy-back price for wind energy (since the 
exact production from wind turbines is not fully predictable even the day before). In some 
cases, producers of wind energy have attempted to set up bilateral trade agreements at a 
slightly higher price than the market price. However, the amounts of power sold through these 
arrangements have been rather marginal.  
Figure 4.3 also shows how integrated the Nordic electricity markets have become with 
identical spot prices. Differences in spot prices can be explained by transmission capacity 
constraints, allowing spot prices to increase more in deficit areas and decrease more in surplus 
areas when the constraint is binding. Even though the electricity spot price is very similar, the 
end-user prices differ in the Nordic countries due to electricity tax, value-added tax and 
transmission tariffs. Figure 4.4 compares the domestic (household) electricity prices in most 
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IEA countries in 2000.39 It is clear that electricity prices to households in Norway are very 
low compared to the other countries. The fact that pretax prices are also low may in part be 
because hydropower is not affected by the CO2 tax (IEA 2001d). 
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Source: www.nordpool.com   
Figure 4.3 Monthly Average Spot Prices at the Nord Pool, 1996-200440 
 
Source: IEA 2001d     
Figure 4.4 Domestic Electricity Prices in IEA countries, 2000.41 
                                                     
39 Figures for Norway apparently exclude transmission tariffs. It is not clear from IEA whether 
comparability is ensured. 
40 Norwegian figure represents the average for Oslo, Bergen, Molde, Trondheim and Tromsø. The 
Danish figure represents the average of the DK-West and the DK-East system. 
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4.2.3 Electricity Balance 
Over the last twenty years, electricity end-use has increased consistently. In the first part of 
this period, the production capacity was larger than the average total use, resulting in net 
exports. However the additional supply has been quite limited since the early 1990s, and 
during the 1990s Norway “on average” came closer to aggregate electricity balance (there is 
always export and import within a year, due to temporal variations). The total electricity 
exchange capacity is approximately 400–600 GWh/week. This implies that in some 
hypothetical, but not unlikely cases, there might be an electricity shortage, due to limited 
power and limited import capacities.42 Transmission capacity is valuable not only during net 
import years but also for gross imports and exports during a zero net import year.  
NVE (2002) has estimated the Norwegian electricity balance towards 2015. Due to the 
dominance of hydropower, the electricity balance depends largely on whether it is a wet, 
normal or dry year. Electricity consumption is based on a “steady growth” scenario with an 
annual 1.2 percent increase in consumption. This is lower than the observed average increase 
for the whole period 1991–2002, which was 1.5 percent. However, for the later part of this 
period (1996–2001), the increase was only 1 percent. The calculations further assume that 
higher electricity prices in a dry year would result in 5 TWh less electricity consumption as 
electric boilers are decoupled. These assumptions reflect natural variations in precipitation in 
Norway and Sweden. These countries also have the most use of electric boilers in multi-fuel 
heating systems. NVE projected that hydropower electricity could increase by 1 TWh by 
2005, 2 TWh in 2010, and 4 TWh in 2015 in normal years. A dry year would only see half 
this production increase. Wind power is to increase to 1 TWh by 2005, 3 TWh in 2010 and 5 
TWh in 2015.  
Figure 4.5 shows that during normal years, it is estimated that Norway would have to 
import 7 TWh in 2005, 12 TWh in 2010 and 15 TWh in 2015. Under normal conditions, such 
import is not problematic, but contributes to uncertainty about supply security. The import 
level in 2015 would bring Norway closer to the import capacity level. The theoretical 
electricity import capacity is 30 TWh, but in reality, import levels cannot reach this level, in 
part because Sweden will be similarly short on electricity in a dry year. It has been estimated 
that a practically feasible level of electricity import can be around 20 TWh between 2005 and 
2015. The estimated demand for electricity would in dry years exceed production and imports 
by 14 TWh in 2005, 18 TWh in 2010 and 19 TWh in 2015, so consumption would have to be 
reduced.43 There are plans to improve the electricity exchange capacity. One example is the 
plan to have a cable between Norway and the Netherlands with capacity of 3–3.5 TWh/year. 
The calculations by NVE do not include any new natural gas-fired power plants. The issue 
of new gas fired power plants is a very ‘hot’ issue on the Norwegian political agenda. This 
was highlighted in 1999 when the Centrist government had to leave its position due to strong 
conflicts over its climate policy. The Centrist government wanted a stricter regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from new gas-fired power plants, but was defeated in Parliament, 
and a Labor party government took office. Licenses have been granted for three gas-fired 
power plants that could produce 12 TWh by 2007 and reduce the dependence on hydropower 
                                                                                                                                                        
41 Ex-tax prices for the United States. Tax information not available for Korea. Data not available for 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Spain and Sweden. 
 
42 Readers should be aware that this description is simplified and on a national level. Local and regional 
conditions within the Nordic countries vary somewhat, both with respect to production capacity and 
bottlenecks in the transmission system.  
 
43 A wet year would have the opposite effect. In 2010, 20 TWh could become available for export or 
increased consumption. 
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and imports.44 These plants are allowed to be built without technologies that can clean the 
CO2 content, but additional plants will need such technologies. These are power plants where 
CO2 is extracted and treated and/or used for other means. One option considered is to use the 
excess CO2 as injection gas into oil fields to increase extraction of oil from a given field. NVE 
(2004b) estimates that CO2 cleaning adds 15-20 øre/kWh to the production costs compared to 
conventional natural gas-fired power plants, while Bolland et al. 2002 estimate the additional 
costs at 18-19 øre/kWh. This means that production costs nearly double, depending on the 
costs of natural gas. Gas-fired power plants will be subject to the permit requirements of the 
Norwegian emissions trading system for 2005–2007 (and the subsequent European system), 
confronting them with a cost of CO2 emissions. It is still very uncertain whether these plants 
will be developed due to the current high price of natural gas, the relative low electricity 
prices, and uncertainty about CO2 costs.  
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(Source: NVE 2002).  
Figure 4.5 Electricity Balance in Norway toward 2015 (normal and dry year). 
4.3 Potential for Green Electricity 
Renewable energy sources other than hydropower do not currently account for any significant 
production of electricity in Norway. Thus a challenge remains to utilize the country’s vast 
renewable energy resources if renewable energy sources are to play a role in meeting the 
future electricity demand. It is clear that wind power and hydropower account for most of the 
presently applicable potential. Figure 4.6 shows the technical and economical potential for 
electricity production from hydro (large and small scale), wind and biomass, and their 
associated costs per kWh (NVE 2004a). The estimates show that at 20 øre/kWh, about 23 
TWh could be built. At the cost of 30 øre/kWh, an additional 84 TWh could be built.  
 
                                                     
44 Interview with Minister for Energy, Thorhild Widvey in Aftenposten 22.11.2004 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/okonomi/article875510.ece 
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Source: NVE 2004a 
Figure 4.6 Technical/Economical Potential for Green Electricity in Norway 
 
There is a technical and economical potential for new large-scale hydropower of 7 TWh 
(20 øre/kWh) and 20 TWh (30 øre/kWh) and 12 TWh from refurbishment and upgrading of 
existing plants. Of this, 3 TWh could be achieved within 10 years under the current 
conditions. The focus has also shifted towards small-scale hydropower (50 kW-10 MW). The 
technical and economical potential for small-scale hydropower is about 13 TWh (20 
øre/kWh) and 20 TWh (30 øre/kWh).  
The best wind resources in Norway are along the western coastline from the southernmost 
tip and east to the Russian border. There are also good resources in some mountain areas, but 
they are considered less likely to be exploited due to environmental concerns. The cost of 
wind power is in the range of 30–35 øre/kWh. At the cost of 30 øre/kWh, it is estimated that 
40 TWh could be built. The installation costs are relatively stable per MW installed, thus the 
resulting energy production cost depends on mean wind speed. In some favorable cases, wind 
energy cost might come down to 25 øre/kWh. However, estimates by NVE show that the 
overall energy potential at such a low cost is rather moderate, i.e. less than 1 TWh. Local 
market conditions and existing transmission capacity matter, since the best wind locations 
will typically be far from important consuming regions.  
The investment costs for biomass electricity generation is quite high, thus the resulting 
electricity price is very high. Estimates on the use of domestic biofuels indicate that some 0.5 
TWh/year from biomass is possible, however at a price range of 20 to 100 øre/kWh. 
Norway’s topography with its many mountains and hills makes it difficult to collect large 
quantities of bioenergy at a low cost. 
4.4 Policies and Policy Instruments 
There are two main factors influencing the development of renewable energy in Norway: 
energy policy and climate policy. Norway’s energy policy is mainly defined in the following 
documents: St. meld. nr 29 (1998-1999), St. meld nr 9 (2002-2003), the”Sem Declaration” of 
the Government, St. meld. 18 (2003-2004) and St.meld. 47 (2003-2004). National targets for 
renewable energy are that (i) by 2010, Norway should have 3 TWh/year from wind energy, 
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and (ii) the use of heat from renewable energy sources (reducing direct electrical heating) 
should be increased by 4 TWh/year. Additionally, the government aims to reduce energy use 
by 4 TWh/year within 2010 compared to a given growth scenario45 (Enova 2004). 
The main stated objective of the Norwegian climate strategy is to comply with the Kyoto 
Protocol, which limits Norway’s quota for greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2008–2012 
to 1 percent higher than in 199046. Estimates by the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority 
(SFT) and the Norwegian Ministry of Finance indicate that the total GHG emissions in 
Norway in 2010 could be 24 percent higher than the 1990 emissions if no measures were 
taken (SFT 2000), with the implication that Norway must combine emission reductions with 
quota purchases abroad. The development in the energy sector will have a great impact on 
Norway’s abilities to meet its commitments. Renewable fuels, and generally increased use of 
renewable energy sources, can reduce GHG emissions. 
The Norwegian authorities have used a range of means to promote renewable energy during 
the last decades. The most important mechanisms have been financial support, tax incentives 
and normative measures. 
4.4.1 Financial Support 
During the 1980s support was mainly focused on R&D. During 1992–2001, NVE was in 
charge of the implementation of the public programs promoting energy efficiency and 
increased use of renewable energy, and recently also natural gas. Figure 4.7 shows the 
financial support from the Research Council of Norway and from NVE (before Enova was 
established) for renewable energy sources-technologies. This includes support to R&D, 
prototype installations and investment support (non-prototype). Funding from NVE was not 
specified for each energy technology, but some limits were defined, as for a scheme for 
heating from renewables and another for wind energy. The funding from the Research 
Council has been subject to competition through applications, and with limited earmarked 
funding for each technology. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, public programs were quite specific with respect to which 
technologies should be supported. Figure 4.7 shows a clear increase in the financial support 
from 1997 when a major subsidy scheme for renewable energy sources was launched. This 
“heating system subsidy scheme” from 1997 to 2001 included bioenergy, waste, industrial 
waste heat and solar energy for heating, and support mechanisms for other types of heating 
rather than the use of direct electricity heating. This subsidy scheme introduced more 
flexibility for market actors to choose between various renewable energy technologies.  
In mid 2001, a new state-owned company, Enova, was established in Trondheim.47 Enova 
is the national agency charged with using public funds to promote renewable energy sources 
and rational use of energy (RUE). In 2003, the Energy fund had NOK 539 million at its 
disposal. NOK 259 million came from the national budget, while NOK 192 million came 
from a surcharge of 0.3 øre/kWh on the transmission tariff. In 2004, the surcharge was 
increased to 0.8 øre/kWh, increasing this funding to about NOK 460 million, combined with 
funding over the national budget of NOK 130 million.  
                                                     
45 Assumes an annual 1.6 percent growth up to 2005 and 1 percent from 2005 to 2020.  
46 Quota purchases are also allowed. 
47 Enova aims at working in a targeted and result-oriented manner close to the energy market actors. It 
focuses on developing incentive schemes and new markets for energy services and products. It will not 
be operative in the market itself, but make use of organisations/institutions/enterprises (operating 
agents) that should compete for assignments and tasks. Furthermore, Enova will offer a nationwide 
public information and guidance service.  
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Figure 4.7 Introductory Support to Renewable Energy Technologies 
 
Table 4.2 summarizes Enova’s use of resources. In 2003, Enova distributed a total of NOK 
283 million in support for five main areas, while the similar figures for 2002 were 235 
million. Enova established contracts with those receiving the investment support and the 
contracts resulted in aggregate energy results of 921 GWh in 2002 and 1827 GWh in 2003. In 
2002, each kWh required 26 øre while the similar figure for 2003 was 16 øre. With project 
lifetimes of 20 years for wind and heat and 10 years for energy use, the investment support 
per kWh over the lifetimes amount to 0.5, 1.0, and 2.4 øre for wind, heat, and energy use 
respectively. NOK 92 million was given to support wind energy in 2003, a total of 1.3 TWh 
of wind energy was contracted in 2003 for the period 2003–2005. The energy result is divided 
over three years depending on when the investment support will be given. Production support 
amounting to 725,000 NOK (equal to 4.75 øre/kWh) was given to wind energy in 2003, but 
no funds are available for 2004 and onwards. 
 
Table 4.2 Enova Support in 2002 and 2003 
Area of focus Support 
(øre/kWh) 
Mill NOK GWh 
Wind 20 127 530 
Heat 10 181 1,343 
Energy use 24 216 874 
Other renewables - 3 1 
Natural gas - 1 0 
Total  529 2,748 
Source: Enova 2004       
 
Figure 4.8 shows R&D-related funding to renewable energy sources. Also the R&D 
funding has changed from initially technology specific to a more competitive basis. Funding 
for wind energy R&D is rather moderate, whereas solar and bioenergy have received most of 
the funding. The funding of R&D-related solar energy projects has mainly been support to 
integrated active solar heating systems on roofs, and to Norwegian PV-module production, 
now supplying the world market. 
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Figure 4.8 R&D Funding for Renewable Energy 
 
Table 4.3 compares Norwegian government energy R&D expenditures in 1999 with the 
case-study countries. The renewables’ share in Norway’s total energy R&D expenditures was 
similar to the share of the USA (10–11 percent), but far lower than the shares in the 
Netherlands and in Germany. However, government renewable energy R&D expenditures per 
capita in Norway are higher than in Germany and the USA. 
 
Table 4.3 Government Energy R&D expenditures* in 1999 
 
Country 
Total energy 
expenditures 
(US$ million) 
Total 
renewables 
expenditures 
(US$ million) 
Renewables 
share 
(percent) 
Renewables 
expenditures 
($)/capita 
Germany 106.8 62.7 58.7 0.8 
Netherlands 133.2 39.5 29.6 2.5 
Sweden 64.9 12.2 18.8 1.4 
USA 2342.0 264.2 11.3 1.0 
Norway 49.0 4.9 10.1 1.1 
* At 2000 prices and exchange rates     Source: IEA 2001c 
 
R&D in technologies rarely results directly in commercial technologies. However the 
intermediate stage – often characterized by prototype or demonstrations – has been partly 
supported by NVE, and partly co-financed by the Research Council. “Innovation Norge” 
(previously SND) has also provided funding to the intermediate stage between R&D and 
commercialized products, and to development of commercialization/business adaptation of 
products, including some energy-related products. Other sources of funding include the 
Ministry of the Environment for renewable energy, and the Ministry of Agriculture for 
bioenergy.  
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An initiative that slows the development of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency 
is the R&D concerning natural gas fired power plants with CO2-cleaning. A focus on the 
development of CO2-cleaning technologies has led to the less focus on renewables. Actual 
funding over the years has increased from 6 million NOK in 2000, while the Research 
Council now allocates about 50 million NOK annually for research in CO2-cleaning. There is 
a strong and wide political willingness to promote R&D-activities by substantial funding. In 
2002, the government decided that a public innovation centre should be established in 
Grenland. This national gas technology program will push for environment-friendly use of 
gas for energy purposes, including CO2 capture and storage. The innovation centre called 
Gassnova was established in January 2005 and it will manage the interests from the fund for 
environment-friendly gas technologies established July 2004. With a capital fund of 2 billion 
NOK, the resources available in 2005 will be about 46 million NOK and from 2006, the 
annual resources will amount to about 92 million NOK. Gassnova will finance the 
development aspect of these technologies while the Research Council will still finance the 
research aspect. 
4.4.2 Tax Incentives 
Norway has a range of taxes on various kinds of energy use, and some of these taxes have an 
environmental basis, established to enhance lower consumption and use of fossil fuels. Table 
4.4 summarizes energy related taxes by the second half of 2004. The conversion to specific 
price per kWh disregards the actual coefficient of performance.  
 
Table 4.4 Overview of Current Energy-related Taxes in Norway 
Type of tax Tax level Typical cost 
(øre48/kWh) 
Comments 
Mineral Oil  
CO2 Tax (øre/l) 
Sulphur Tax (øre/l pr 0.25 percent S) 
Base Tax (øre/l) 
 
52 
7 
40.5 
 
4.6 
2.5 
3.7 
 
Heavy Fuel Oil* 
Heavy Fuel Oil 1percent S 
Heavy Fuel Oil* 
Waste 
CO2 (kr/ton waste) 
Polluting fumes (kr/ton waste) 
 
39.70 
65-100 
 
1.4 
2.3-3.4 
 
** 
*** 
Electricity tax (user) 
General electricity tax  
Electricity tax in industry and district heating 
  
9.67 
0.45 
VAT is added on for the 
end-user, but not in all 
counties. 
Source: Compiled by Norsk Energi November 2004 
*     Pulp and paper does not pay Base Tax, and pays only about half of the CO2 tax 
**   Non-fossil waste is exempted 
*** Indicative values  
 
Traditional oil for fuel purposes has three different taxes. The CO2 tax is environmental or 
climate-related tax. The sectors/activities foreign shipping, fishing and external aviation are 
exempted from the CO2 tax. The sectors/activities pulp and paper industry, fishmeal industry, 
domestic aviation, domestic shipping of goods and the supply fleet on the continental shelf 
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face a reduced CO2 tax rate. The sulphur tax is also an environmental tax, scaled according to 
every 0.25 percent of sulphur in the oil. Various reductions in the tax are achieved through the 
installation and use of appropriate fume gas cleaning. The base tax is a fiscal tax from which 
several energy intensive industrial branches are exempted. There is now no energy or 
environmental tax on gas, coal or biofuels. For coal, apart from in non-fuel process usages 
(which had and have tax exemptions), there were no more users. There is a set of taxes on 
various types of waste to be incinerated. In addition there is a CO2 tax per ton of waste. Non-
fossil waste is not charged the CO2 tax. Energy production facilities in the industry based on 
waste derived fuels are also exempted, according to certain specifications, and on the 
condition that they get permission from the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT).  
Electricity supplied to industry, industrial processes and district heating faces a reduced 
electricity tax compared to other end-users. Some specific industrial processes49 are exempted 
from the electricity tax. In addition, consumers in Finnmark and some counties in Northern 
Troms are exempted from the electricity tax, and consumers in Finnmark, Troms and 
Nordland are exempted from VAT on electricity. 
In general, it is politically difficult to add new taxes. Nevertheless, the electricity tax 
doubled from 1997 to 2001, leading to more general awareness of the tax. During 2001 there 
was a tremendous public (and political) debate over the electricity tax, and the result was a 
small reduction (it is also very hard to reduce already established taxes). In the late 1990s, 
there was an initiative to remove the investment tax on investments related to the use of 
renewable energy sources. However, the entire investment tax was soon thereafter removed in 
all sectors, thus resetting the competition baseline for renewable versus conventional fuels. 
Traditionally, since the early 1980s, the use of direct economic subsidies have been the major 
measure to prompt energy efficiency and increased use of renewable energy sources. In 
addition to direct investment subsidies, a production support on wind-energy based electricity 
was introduced in 1999. However the production support was abolished by Enova in 2003. 
4.4.3 The EU RES Directive and Norwegian Green Certificate System 
The EU’s RES Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market became effective from October 
2001. The purpose of the RES Directive is to increase the share of power produced by 
renewable energy sources in the EU common market. This is seen as important for reasons of 
security and diversification of energy supply, environmental protection, and social and 
economic cohesion. The directive states that the increased use of electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources constitutes an important part of the package of measures needed to 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The specific goals are to increase the share of renewable 
energy in gross national energy consumption from 6 percent (1997) to 12 percent (2010), 
while the share of electricity produced from renewables shall increase from 13.9 percent 
(1997) to 22.1 percent (2010). Under the RES Directive, all countries are obliged to have a 
system in place for ‘Guarantees of Origin’ for all renewable energy production by October 
2003. These Guarantees of Origin do not have to be tradable, but may in such a case function 
as green certificates. In countries with a green certificate system already in place, it is likely 
that the system will be used for Guarantees of Origin (van Dijk et. al 2003).50 
                                                     
49( i) Electricity supplied to chemical reduction, electrolyses, metallurgical or mineralogical processes, 
(ii) electricity supplied to the pulp and paper industry (on the condition of participation in programs on 
energy efficiency), (iii) electricity produced in energy recovery systems and supplied directly to the end 
user, (iv) electricity produced in backpressure systems, and (v) electricity supplied to greenhouses. 
 
50 A prototype green certificate and trading system for Europe has already been established: RECS 
(Renewable Energy Certificate Trading System) independent from the ‘Guarantees of Origin’ and from 
governments. This system has members ranging from utilities to power brokers and wind turbine 
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The RES Directive does not specify the policy instruments that the member countries 
should use to reach the given targets. However, green certificates were suggested as a 
common policy instrument during the preparation of the directive. But since there was 
uncertainty whether this was the most effective policy instrument, no agreement was reached 
on having a compulsory common system of green certificates. Instead, the RES Directive 
requires countries to ensure that the origin of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources can be guaranteed (NVE 2004a). The intermediate progress at the end of 2002 
showed a progress much less than anticipated, thus EU has signaled increased pressure on the 
member states to increase implementation. The Commission shall, not later than 27 October 
2005, present a report on the experience gained from the application and coexistence of 
different policy instruments. If necessary, the report may be accompanied by a proposal for a 
Community framework with regard to support schemes for electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources. It is perceived that green certificates may be part of such a 
Community framework.  
The RES Directive is important for Norway since Norway is governed by the same basic 
rules as the 25 EU member countries. The RES Directive will therefore also be implemented 
in Norway. The directive requires each country to submit progress reports on the development 
of increased percentage of electricity, but the indicators of renewable electricity shares will be 
determined by each country for itself.51  
In 2000, the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) commissioned a report on a green 
certificate system (GCS) adapted to Norwegian and Nordic conditions. The background for 
this request was the on-going work on green certificates in the EU (Budsjettinnst. S.nr. 9 
(2000-2001)). As a follow-up to this request, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
commissioned three reports52 in 2001 and another three in 2002 to consider using green 
certificates for promoting electricity produced by renewable energy sources. In the White 
Paper on Natural Gas (St.meld.nr. 9 (2002-2003)), the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
concluded that a national GCS would not function as intended. There would, especially in the 
initial phase, be a limited amount of green electricity that could be included in a GCS. This 
was due to long permit processes and construction time. Additionally, it was felt that a 
national GCS would add to the lack of continuity in Norwegian energy policies since Enova 
had just been established and since an international GCS potentially could arise. The Ministry 
therefore recommended continuing with the current practice of promoting renewable energy 
through Enova. At the same time, the Ministry was positive to establishing an international 
GCS and recommended that Norway should participate in such a system. The Ministry 
therefore decided to continue working on establishing a GCS, which could be adapted to an 
international certificate system.  
Then, in conjunction with the passing of St.meld.nr. 9 (2002-2003) March 2003, the 
Norwegian Parliament decided to “…request that the government to take the initiative to 
establish a preferably joint Swedish/Norwegian mandatory Green Certificate Market that 
eventually can be coordinated with an international trading scheme, and a proposed 
implementation plan should be presented for the Storting no later than Spring 2004” 
                                                                                                                                                        
owners’ associations. So far, national groups within RECS have been established in Denmark, Norway, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Austria and France.  
 
51 Another EU directive, of May 5, 2001, COM (2001) 226, “Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Energy Performance of Buildings”, could also have implications 
for Norway. The main features are a common European methodology describing the measurement of 
energy use, minimum standards to buildings on energy performance, energy certificates on buildings 
and increased use of inspection of boilers and HVAC equipment in buildings. 
 
52 See: http://odin.dep.no/oed/norsk/dok/026021-220005/dok-bn.html (in Norwegian); Bye et al. 2002a, 
2002b; ECON 2002; Eldegard 2002; Kristiansen 2002a, 2002b. 
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(Author’s translation). In St.meld. nr. 18 (2003-2004), a common Norwegian-Swedish GCS 
was one of the ten recommended actions to reduce the electricity production’s vulnerability to 
reduced precipitation. In St.meld. nr. 47 (2003-2004), the Ministry proposed to establish a 
Norwegian-Swedish GCS. The Government presented a draft law-proposal regarding a 
mandatory certificate scheme in November 2004, but has not yet specified the level (amount) 
of renewable energy to be mandatory. The Government aimed to introduce a GCS consistent 
and linked with Sweden’s from January 1, 2006, but this has now been delayed by a year.53 
4.5 Barriers to Market Development  
Despite a constant development both in industrial installations and technological 
development, the label “alternative” energy is still associated with the renewable energy 
sources, apart from hydropower. However, with the remaining higher electricity prices in the 
last two years, the interest in energy issues has increased. With the strong seasonal changes in 
the energy prices, it takes a long time before the average (increasing) price is apparent to the 
general public. It seems that the concern about the energy costs attracts more attention than 
environmental concerns. In a survey on electricity prices made for Enova, it is reported that 
“Norwegian consumers have an almost senseless attitude toward their personal electricity 
consumption and show little willingness to reduce the use of energy”.54   
 A large portion of the population lives along the coast where the electrical grid supplying 
the coast often is quite weak. As wind power is becoming more relevant, grid limitations will 
prohibit large-scale wind power. Additionally, larger buildings used to be equipped with 
piped heating systems, and it is a good basis for the fuel switch from oil to biofuel. In the 
1970s the steadily increasing use of direct electrical heating virtually eliminated the boiler 
room. The all-electric installations also prohibit a relatively easy change of fuel. The use of 
district heating exists in larger towns and cities, but these systems are still lacking in many 
towns.  
The use of renewable energy sources might be considered problematic, at least in terms of 
learning. There is often a fear that new technology is more demanding to use or will be of 
lower quality. Low electricity prices combined with demanding requirements for low payback 
(pay-off) time on investments have been the major barriers to the use of upfront relatively 
more expensive equipment. Many still regard low electricity prices as something they are 
entitled to as citizens of a country rich in natural resources, and manufacturing (often 
cornerstone industries) often benefits from favorable electricity contracts. 
Barriers against hydropower. Public opinion on hydropower seems to be quite divided. 
Those favoring may have economic interests, while opposing may be affected directly by 
either hydropower plants or the regulation of rivers, as with fishermen and individuals with 
conservation interests. During the 1950s and 1960s, hydropower utilization and power station 
development was closely linked to the industrialization of Norway. However by the late 
1960s the attitude had changed, and some of the first major protests arose in Mardøla and 
Nordmarka (hydropower development and power line demonstrations). The construction of 
the Alta dam sparked significant controversy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Later, the 
political signals have been not to expand large hydropower. In his New Year’s speech in 
2001, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg stated that the time for new large hydropower was 
over.  
                                                     
53 Press release from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Feb. 14, 2005. 
54 The Norway Post, Dec.2, 2002. 
(http://www.norwaypost.no/content.asp?cluster_id=21312&folder_id=5) 
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Barriers against wind energy. It has been debated how high the development density 
should be to limit the assumed environmental impact of wind energy. Also, grid limitations 
pose a substantial hurdle to large-scale wind power development. The economic 
responsibility for associated transmission projects has not yet been clarified. Naturally the 
very proximity between wind turbines and the end user is technically positive (as it can 
reduce grid transmission costs and losses, and also limit the impact on the wilderness). 
However, large-scale wind turbines, up to 100 meters high, have been considered 
environmentally negative in several cases along the Norwegian coastline. Some reviews have 
been made concerning the impact of wind farms on wildlife, which mostly show positive 
results.55  
Barriers against Bioenergy. The use of bioenergy has both positive and negative aspects. 
The positive effects are reduced CO2 emissions compared to the use of fossil fuels. At the 
same time, the use of bioenergy may or may not reduce the other emissions to air that have 
regional and local impacts, and may or may not increase transportation activities locally and 
nationally. However, the use of local biofuel leads to a safer energy supply locally. The 
challenges and barriers against the increased use of bioenergy are mainly the high investment 
cost of the equipment, fuel collection cost, the need for piped heating systems, etc. There is 
also a greater need for maintenance to biofuel equipment than oil burners. For these reasons, 
support for and installation of biofuels systems mainly concentrates on larger scale users, not 
single households. 
5 Lessons learned for policy development  
While the experiences of the four case study countries have been quite different, some clear 
lessons emerge. This section reviews the main lessons learned from the case study countries, 
and their implications for Norway about agenda setting, policy design, and implementation. It 
concludes with some specific policy recommendations for Norway.  
5.1 Objectives and Agenda Setting 
One of the clearest lessons to emerge from the case studies is the importance of a clear, 
consistent, and coherent policy. Germany, which has had consistent support in the electorate, 
has consistently devoted resources and has had consistently impressive results. The 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway, on the other hand, have had inconsistent and changing 
policies, which have resulted in little success in terms of deployment. For a country to 
develop a clear and consistent policy on green electricity, with the appropriate resources 
allocated to its implementation, it must place green electricity high on the political agenda. 
In Europe, green electricity development is gaining priority on the political agenda. The EU 
is committed to reducing CO2 emissions within its member states, and some EU countries 
have set ambitious targets for their renewable energy production and consumption by 2010 
and 2020 respectively (International Action Programme 2004). Among the motivating factors 
are the greenhouse gas issue, a desire to reduce fossil fuel burning due to pollution problems 
(local and regional); the view that decentralized renewable energy sources can help energy 
security and reduce risks in the electricity sector; and finally that developing renewable 
energy sources can provide new jobs and other social benefits.   
                                                     
55 A behavior test on reindeer was performed by Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetverk. This study showed 
no significant behavior change of the reindeer. Swedish reviews conducted by SEA have shown little 
or no impact on most animals and birds. However a recent study has shown some effects on bats, 
which fly into turbines at night. Objections by the Norwegian military defense against possible wind 
farms are based on a claim that the wind turbines obstruct the radars. 
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As in most other countries, green electricity policy in Norway is motivated by a blend of 
two major underlying policy objectives: energy security and greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. For both of these objectives, consistency across European countries is a relevant 
question. For energy security, scenarios of risk will differ across countries. Whether solutions 
for Europe are relevant for Norway will depend inter alia on the extent to which Norway’s 
risks are comparable to those in other European countries and on transmission capacity. For 
Norway, extended periods of low rainfall is an important scenario behind shortage of 
electricity. This is to some extent also the case for Sweden, and those rainfall scenarios move 
together. Since for most other countries, including in Northern Europe, energy security relates 
to totally different risk scenarios, renewables should not be portrayed as playing the same role 
in energy security in Norway as they do in the rest of Europe, even in Sweden. For 
greenhouse gas mitigation, solutions outside Norway are relevant to the global problem, but 
Norway’s international obligations depend on emission reductions in Norway or quota 
purchases, and neither of these are ensured through transnational instruments such as an 
envisaged transnational green electricity certificates system. 
The passage of the RES Directive suggests that Europe might edge towards a common 
green certificates market and related policies. Norway needs to consider carefully its own 
situation and policy options to stimulate green electricity in the future. Without such stimulus, 
electricity demand will be met either by imports or by – it seems – domestic natural gas-fired 
power plants (with or without carbon capture and storage). Natural gas-fired power plants 
with carbon capture and storage represent an interesting combination of fossil fuels with zero 
contribution to greenhouse gas warming, but have yet to prove competitive in terms of costs. 
Imports, on the other hand, contribute to global GHG emissions (since the imported electricity 
typically will originate from coal fired plants), even though they do not add to Norway’s 
emissions in the context of the country’s Kyoto commitments. 
Norway’s commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions now will be guided to a great 
extent by the European emission trading system until 2007, and by trading under the Kyoto 
Protocol until 2012. The Norwegian commitment (International Action Programme 2004) at 
the Bonn International Renewable Energy Conference indicates political will to support green 
electricity generation in Norway.  
5.2 Policy Design  
In addition to a high placement on the political agenda, a clear, consistent, and cohesive 
policy design requires a careful consideration of the policy options available. For Norway, the 
policy instruments employed so far are funds for research and the Enova funding mechanism 
(for renewables as well as energy conservation). At this point, the main focus when looking 
ahead is on the proposed introduction of a joint green certificate scheme with Sweden in June 
2006. The proposed joint green certificate system has been open for public consultation and 
will be submitted to Parliament in 2005. 
The challenge for Norway will be to choose one or more policy instruments to create a 
more complete and coherent policy design. Below, we briefly describe the features of the 
main policy instruments used in the case-study countries and their significance for Norway. 
(See table 5.1 for an overview.) 
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Table 5.1  Policy Instruments: Objectives, Advantages/Disadvantages in Implementation  
Policy 
Instruments 
Objectives &  
Characteristics 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Feed-in tariffs Financial scheme 
ensuring a premium 
payment to the 
verified production 
from eligible 
electricity sources 
(investments, 
typically) 
Can ensure long-term 
return, relatively simple to 
implement (but laws may 
need to be defined), 
flexible (different 
technologies can be 
provided with different 
tariffs, contract lengths, 
etc.), low administrative 
costs. 
May not ensure long-term 
target.  
Requires good 
management.  
Transparency needed.  
Not cost-effective. 
Green 
certificate 
scheme 
Combines obligation 
for consumers to use 
a share of green 
electricity, with 
certification of green 
electricity production.  
Encourages competition 
and cost effectiveness.  
Relies on market 
mechanism for resource 
utilization and (within 
green) technology choice  
May not do much for high 
cost technologies.  
Transaction costs can be 
high.  
Transparency and 
verification systems 
needed 
May not meet quantitative 
target. 
Renewable 
energy fund 
Financial instrument 
to support GE, either 
in R&D or in 
application, from 
general revenue or 
through surcharge on 
electricity use. 
Can potentially use 
government subsidy, 
private funds and through 
surcharges. 
Reliance on subsidies if not 
financed by surcharge on 
electricity use, requires 
good management, tight 
objectives, transparency 
needed.  
Not cost-effective. Subsidy 
on energy use.  
No guarantee for meeting 
quantitative target. 
Tax incentives Fiscal instrument to 
reduce costs for GE 
consumers or 
producers. 
Consumers and producers’ 
interest in GE can be better 
mobilized.  
Low administrative costs. 
Potential limit of tax 
benefits.  
Transparency complicated. 
Not cost-effective. Subsidy 
on energy use.  
No guarantee for meeting 
quantitative target. 
Voluntary 
green 
electricity 
scheme  
Mobilize consumer’s 
interest in GE. 
Provide flexibility and 
equity to GE 
consumers for their 
support 
Encourage wider 
consumers’ participation 
and generate additional 
fund from consumers.  
Low administrative costs. 
Effectiveness depends on 
electricity prices and 
consumers’ access to 
information.  
Not cost-effective.  
No guarantee for meeting 
quantitative target. 
 
5.2.1 Feed-in Tariffs  
Feed-in tariffs pay green electricity producers according to the kilowatt hours they ‘feed’ into 
the grid. The feed-in tariff can provide the producer either a guaranteed price per kilowatt 
hour of green electricity, or a guaranteed premium. The tariff may be financed by subsidies 
from the state. However, mobilizing the funds via surcharges on electric power in general is 
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meaningful both in terms of political communication and as a solid (but not compelling) 
public finance principle. Promoting green electricity production through feed-in tariffs can be 
both transparent and flexible. Feed-in tariffs have proven effective in Germany, particularly in 
mobilizing producers/investors’ interest and participation. They have helped to substantially 
increase the market share of key renewable energy technologies such as wind and solar PV in 
the past decade. This instrument is flexible in allowing different technologies to be given 
different tariffs.56 However, it should be noted that Germany’s results must be seen in 
connection with the high feed-in tariff levels applied. In 2001, German electricity customers 
spent 1,540 million Euro for renewables under the EEG, which equals a cost of 0.18-0.26 
Eurocents/kWh. Thus the impressive results could perhaps be attributed more to the high 
funding level for each kWh output than to the particular choice of instrument.  
5.2.2 A Green Certificate Scheme with Obligated Green Electricity Shares 
A green certificate scheme defines a certain set of technologies as green, and certifies 
electricity from eligible producers. It is often accompanied by a quota system that obligates 
the producer or consumer to a certain share of green electricity. The government will most 
often define the mandatory quotas, and decide on principles of certification of green 
production, issue certificates, and facilitate and monitor a market for those certificates. The 
system is in principle similar to the feed-in tariff system, in the sense that it combines ‘a tax’ 
on non-green electricity (the cost of the quota obligation) with subsidies on green electricity 
production. Green certificates provide a strong incentive for market competition and cost 
reduction. It escapes the tax concept, but of course uses government authority both in the 
quota obligation and in the choice of green technologies and their certification.  
A quota system, combined with green certificates, is currently being implemented or is 
planned in a number of EU Member States (Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and the 
UK). Being ‘mainstream’ or prepared for these developments is thus a potential argument for 
quota-based certificates (as are presently being proposed in Norway). A common EU system 
for green electricity certificates would have strong similarities to a CO2 emissions trading 
system in that it would take advantage of cost differences across countries. Such a system 
presumably would result in expanding the production of hydro- and wind power in Norway 
and bioenergy in Sweden, assuming that they prove competitive within the defined realm of 
green technologies in Europe. But there are several reasons to be more tentative, and perhaps 
move forward slowly. First, an integrated system allows Norwegian resources to support 
green electricity production abroad, which may not be consistent with Norwegian policy 
objectives, neither for energy security nor for Kyoto obligations. Second, as chapter 3 reports, 
the quota and certificate system in Sweden seems to involve high administration costs and has 
run into implementation challenges (though it may be too early to judge the system).57 Third, 
it is not certain that EU will, in the end, support a green certificates system, nor what shape it 
would take, so the value of Norway’s being ahead rather than prepared is not proven.  
5.2.3 A Renewable Energy Fund and Other ‘General Revenue’ Schemes 
A national Renewable Energy Fund could be an effective tool to manage and use the money 
accrued from different sources. It resembles the fund of resources collected through a feed-in 
tariff system, but differs in its broader or more general revenue base, and in the predictability 
of the fund structure. Renewable energy funds may be private or semiprivate, as would be 
natural should revenue come from voluntary green certificates markets (e.g. not driven by 
obligated shares), from surcharges on energy (like today’s Enova), from contributions within 
                                                     
56 One can invite bidders to offer renewable energy for a fixed subsidy over a twenty year period, for 
instance, if desirable in different auctions for different technologies.  
57 It now appears the target of increasing green electricity production in Sweden will not likely be 
achieved, but changes are being made. Slow progress may be due to teething problems, and the long 
lead times for large projects. 
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a specific industry seeking to solve its own problems technologically, or from private 
donations. A proposal to use a dedicated share of the Norwegian National Petroleum Fund 
(Gan 2001) should be treated in line with using general tax revenue, and be consistent with 
the institutional framework for the Fund’s resources (which it presently would not be). A 
renewable energy fund could be used to support R&D, demonstration, and even public 
campaigns and NGOs’ participation. The advantages of operating such a fund are its 
flexibility to receive and channel funds from different sources, and using the money in 
accordance with public interest and policy objectives.  
5.2.4 Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives are another subsidy-like way of reducing the cost burden for green electricity 
producers or investors. They have the disadvantage of requiring an administrative machinery 
for tax collection also to handle aspects of a green electricity policy. Tax incentives are used 
as instruments in Norway in areas such as the encouragement of general R&D within 
businesses. A principal feature of this instrument is that, in contrast to subsidies, it works 
effectively only on firms and individuals in taxable position. As with incentives through 
subsidies, tax incentives could potentially be set at different levels to support those 
technologies desirable by government policy objectives.  
5.2.5 A Voluntary Green Electricity Scheme 
Voluntary green electricity schemes can be found in many European countries (Austria, 
Germany, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and UK) but also in the 
United States, Canada, Japan and Australia. Electricity companies are offering green 
electricity as an additional strategy to both keep their current customers and attract new ones 
(Business Insights 2002). Government or non-government bodies can then be involved in 
certifying green production (government, in the RES Directive), facilitating the channeling of 
a potential interest from environmentally concerned consumers. Such a scheme is an 
alternative (or possibly a supplement) to a green electricity scheme based on obligatory 
quotas, and as such uses less government power, relies more on consumer motivation, and in 
most settings will achieve a lower penetration. A voluntary system can even allow consumers 
to demand specific types of power (e.g. wind) if the power is labeled to allow this. This can 
be done if a specific producer advertises its share of wind in its production, and thereby sells 
at a premium directly to consumers.   
5.3 Policy Implementation 
Once a policy is designed, its success depends on the extent to which it is implemented. 
Implementation, in turn, depends greatly on existing capacity and efforts to build capacity.  
The role of investors and project developers is important in realizing the policy objectives. 
This means that policy makers have to understand the main driving forces of the private 
sector, and both risks and profit margins mainly determine investment decisions. These 
indicators are more important compared to short-term financial incentives. In general terms, 
the effectiveness of policies to stimulate renewable energy is best guaranteed if objectives and 
policies are stable and predictable, allowing confidence and a long time horizon among key 
stakeholders. Market uncertainties need to be minimized, and stakeholders should feel secure 
about future developments in policy. The effectiveness of instruments such as subsidies and 
tax incentives could decrease if these instruments are applied in a ‘stop-and-go’ manner. All 
case-study countries have experienced this with promotion schemes when conditions changed 
frequently during implementation.  
Participation of a wide range of stakeholders provides a good basis for renewable electricity 
policy development. The German case shows that involvement of a wide set of stakeholders 
has many advantages, and the Dutch case shows the importance of effective coordination 
CICERO Report 2005:03  
Green Electricity Market Development 
 
 
 
 
57
between national and local governments. If different levels of authorities have different 
objectives or interests, the implementation process could be severely hindered.  
Environmental NGOs and the media can play critical roles in bridging the gap between 
general public and government authorities and concerned industries. They also function as 
“watchdogs” to generate social debate and attempt to keep governmental policies moving in 
the right direction. The media can also help ensure effective monitoring of policy 
implementation at different levels in society.   
Competence building among customers, consulting engineers, renewable energy experts, 
architects, and other professionals is generally important to increased use of renewable energy 
sources. It may be costly to acquire the interdisciplinary qualifications that are needed in the 
planning of complex projects. Conservatism in the power and building sectors, as well as time 
constraints, often result in the use of familiar solutions. Courses and education have been and 
will still be a positive initiative, including both information integrated in professional 
education, as well as post-qualifying education. Information about advantages, possible 
savings, tender rules, and purchasing process and rules is important to increase the 
consciousness about renewable energy sources and purchase options.  
5.4 Overall recommendations for Norway 
Norway has a stated goal of increasing the use of renewable energy technologies, such as 
wind, wave, tidal, and solar power, as well as bioenergy and hydropower (in case of the latter, 
perhaps limited to small-scale plants). The European Union also shares the objective of 
increasing the share of green electricity in production/consumption. These objectives are 
reflected in Norway’s recently proposed law on green electricity certificates and in the EU’s 
RES Directive. 
The modest penetration of these renewable technologies (with the exception of 
hydropower) can be largely ascribed to their high cost relative to alternatives, and market 
prices. There is an obvious potential for government intervention to help reduce the costs of 
renewable sources of energy, thus increasing their market share. A carefully designed policy 
framework can assist the use of green electricity in Norway, in the sense of alternatives to 
hydropower, CO2-emitting natural gas plants, and imports, which otherwise represent 
plausible expansion paths. Key challenges are to ensure consistency with underlying policy 
objectives as well as with potential conflicts between key instruments, and to minimize 
implementation costs. 
To expand the share of green electricity in the short term, two instruments in particular 
stand out as being potentially attractive for Norway: green certificates and feed-in tariffs. 
Both of these instruments combine the equivalent of a tax on non-green electricity with a 
subsidy on green electricity. From a theoretical perspective they are fairly similar, but in 
practice there are reasons to see the feed-in tariffs as combining lower administrative costs 
with very attractive flexibility in terms of policy goals. However, if Sweden and the EU 
implement a certificates system in ways fairly consistent with Norwegian policy objectives, 
then this provides one argument for Norway to go along with a similar, consistent certificate 
system. While Norway’s goals in areas such as climate policy and energy security will not be 
entirely equivalent to those of the neighboring countries, the value of implementing 
instruments jointly with other countries might be important enough for Norway to adjust its 
strategy accordingly. 
For either of these instruments to be successful in the long run, they must succeed in 
making green electricity more competitive, i.e. bringing down the costs that will prevail 
absent government intervention. While  increased adoption of renewables can do an important 
job, this suggests that an overall policy design could include strategies for investment in 
R&D. R&D can be stimulated in the early phases with basic research subsidies, provided 
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there are other systems (green certificates or feed-in tariffs) to create markets for solutions. 
The applied end of RD&D should then be left to the private sector.   
There are other instruments that may also fit well in a general policy design package, but 
the focus should be on consistency, and instruments should compensate for each others’ 
weaknesses. It is also important to consider the costs of administration, which may very well 
increase disproportionately as more policy instruments are added. Finally, as the case studies 
illustrate, great emphasis should be placed on communication, stability and credibility: stop-
and-go measures, reversals and confusion will generally have high costs.  
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